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Abstract
This thesis consists of four chapters, covering a range of economic fields and methodologies.
Chapter 1, joint work with Vinzenz Ziesemer, investigates how skill supply incentives and
general equilibrium wage effects shape the earnings distribution, connecting two separate
strands of the literature on earnings inequality. On the one hand, the literature on skill-
biased technological change studies how general equilibrium effects between different
types of workers shape relative earnings and thus the income distribution. On the other
hand, the literature on taxation suggests that incentives to accumulate human capital
drive the earnings distribution. Combining data on occupational skills and US Census
data, we first show empirically that job skills can be summarized by two dimensions:
manual and cognitive skills. We show further that the latter strongly correlates with
traditional measures of schooling, while the former does not. Based on these observations,
we build a model featuring both human captial accumulation incentives for cognitive
skills and general equilibrium wage effects between manual and cognitive skill prices. We
theoretically investigate the response of the earnings distribution to changes in the tax
progressivity which alter the incentives to accumulate cognitive human capital. It is shown
that changes in tax progressivity like those occurring during the second half of the 20th
century can lead to polarization in the labor market. A calibrated version of the model
predicts these effects to be relatively small quantitatively.
Chapters 2 and 3 empirically investigate the effects of international agreements on
import shares in the government sector, focusing on different types of agreements and
methodologies. Chapter 2, joint work with Bernard Hoekman, employs a cross-country
panel regression framework to study the effect of the WTO Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA) on government sector import shares in the aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis. A growing trade policy literature investigates the potential role of international
agreements in reducing future policy uncertainty and thereby facilitating trade. This
potentially provides an alternative channel for the GPA to impact trade in addition
to faciliating reciprocal market access. Our results are suggestive of such international
disciplines acting as an effective commitment device: GPA membership is associated with
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a significantly higher import share following the 2008 financial crisis than is observed for
countries that are not members. In addition, there is evidence that the GPA and PTAs
that cover public procurement are partial substitutes.
Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between the depth of PTA public procurement
provisions and their trade effects. Recently, an increasing number of PTAs include public
procurement chapters, characterized by an increasing level of detail. The emergence and
proliferation of detailed PP provisions in PTAs raises the question of whether these more
substantive types of agreements have a real effects on bilateral trade in a systematic way.
In this chapter I study to what extent the proliferation and deepening of PP provisions in
recent PTAs leads to tangible changes in the tradeflows they cover, using a bilateral gravity
framework. Previous research has not found real effects of PP openness commitments
and attributed this to a lack of legal enforceability (Rickard and Kono 2014). I revisit
this question using more direct measures of PP imports and a novel classification of PTA
PP provisions by Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018), explicitly designed to distinguish PP
provisions by their legal enforceability. I find that the presence of deep PP provisions
is indeed associated with significantly higher trade volume absorbed by the government
sector in the importing country. When looking at government imports disaggregated by
economic sector, it becomes clear that this aggregate finding is driven primarily by service
sector imports. Furthermore, the real impact of PP provisions seems to be driven primarily
by the European Union. The results are not robust to excluding intra-EU bilateral flows.
Chapter 4 is joint work with Árpád Ábrahám and T. Kirk White. The chapter describes
a research proposal aiming to study the effect of the ownership structures along supply
chains on firms’ bargaining power in input markets. Two recent contributions document
that (a) supply chain considerations are not the prime focus of vertical integration and (b)
input prices display substantial heterogeneity across U.S. firms. In this paper, we propose
to empirically test whether vertical integration and input price dispersion are related, using
unique features of U.S. Economic Census micro data that have already been employed by
Atalay et al. (2014) and Atalay (2014). In particular, we argue that owning productive
capacities upstream endows firms with informational or bargaining advantages which result
in lower procurement prices for their downstream units. We propose to decompose input
price dispersion in a between-supplier and a within-supplier component and investigate
how both components contribute to the input price advantage of vertically integrated
firms. This project sheds light on the determinants of measured firm productivity. Input
price dispersion through the between-supplier component predicts measured productivity
dispersion through supplier selection, while within-supplier price dispersion implies that
measured productivity dispersion is driven by differences in supplier market power.
2
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisors, Piero Gottardi and Árpád Ábrahám,
for their guidance and support over the past years. Both have always been available, also
on short notice, to discuss any issue I might have had and I learned a lot from them.
Enghin Atalay and Simon Evenett kindly agreed to become part of the committee of this
thesis. I would like to thank them for taking the time to read and comment on my work.
I’d also like to thank Philipp Kircher and especially Bernard Hoekman. Working for and
with both of them has been integral for the completion of this thesis.
Three out of the four chapters of this thesis are co-authored. First, I’d like to thank
Vinzenz. Not only did we work together on several projects – some more successful than
others – but also for all my other academic endeavors he was always up for a discussion.
I’d also like to thank Árpád for putting me in touch with Kirk and Kirk for his availability
and patience in our coordination-intensive trans-atlantic collaboration. Finally, I’d like to
thank Bernard again. He gave me a new perspective on research when I was in need and
two chapters in the present thesis grew out of my work with him.
The EUI is an exceptional place to write a PhD. I would like to thank the German
Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the EUI for enabling me to be part of this
community over the past years.
During my time in Florence, I am glad to have met a lot of people without whom the
past years would not have been the same. Thanks to David and Simon, João and Fabian,
Vinzenz, Agnieszka, Liiri and Francesca, Ginevra, Noa, Daniel, Gözde, Ada, Tobias and
Mariana. Thanks to my entire econ-cohort.
I would like to thank my family, my parents and my siblings Josefa, Theresia and Kilian.
I’ve always had their support and I consider myself very lucky to have them in my life.
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my grandfathers, Hermann Dengler and Alfred




1 Polarization: A Supply-Side Mechanism 7
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Manual and Cognitive Skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2.2 Empirics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3.2 Individual Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4 Tax Policy, Inequality Changes and Polarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.1 A simple static framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.2 Policy changes and earnings distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.3 Conditions for Inequality Growth and Polarization . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5 Models versus Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5.1 Across Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5.2 Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6 An Enriched Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6.1 Model Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6.2 Parameterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.6.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.6.4 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.A PCA Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2 The WTO Government Procurement Agreement as a Commitment De-
vice: A First Economic Appraisal 45
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2 Background and Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2.1 Trade policy and trade agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2.2 The GPA and PTAs with procurement provisions . . . . . . . . . 50
5
2.2.3 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3 Openness of public procurement markets, the GPA and PTAs: Descriptive
evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 Empirical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4.1 Placebo regression results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.5 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3 Trade Volume Effects of Public Procurement Provisions in Preferential
Trade Agreements 75
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2.1 Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) PTA Classification . . . . . . . . 79
3.2.2 World Input Output Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2.3 Bilateral trade flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.3.1 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.3.2 Baseline Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4 EU as a single entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4.1 Summary Statistics on EU level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4.2 Regression results on EU level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.A World Input Output Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.B Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.B.1 Two-year panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.B.2 Gross public import flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.B.3 Placebo regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4 Determinants of Input Price Dispersion 109
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.3 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119






This Chapter is joint work with Vinzenz J. Ziesemer.
Abstract
The literature on earnings inequality consists of two disparate strands. On the one hand,
skill-biased technological change describes how general equilibrium effects between different
types of workers shape the income distribution. On the other, the literature on taxation
suggests that incentives to accumulate human capital drive the earnings distribution. This
paper combines both approaches, underpinned by an empirical analysis of occupational
skill data. We find that incentive changes in taxation like those that occurred in the 2nd
half of the 20th century can lead to polarization of the labor market. This supply- or policy-




The effect of tax incentives on the formation of human capital have been studied extensively,
both in positive (e.g. Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan, 2014) and normative (e.g. Stantcheva,
2017) contexts. This paper studies the incentive effects of taxation when human capital
is multi-dimensional and the labor market is cleared in general equilibrium. Our results
shed new light on relative movements of the earnings distribution. First, the presence of
multi-dimensional skills can rationalize the relative unresponsiveness of low earnings to
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tax incentives. Second, we present a novel labor supply-driven mechanism for polarization
of the earnings distribution to arise. The interaction between accumulation incentives
and general equilibrium effects turns out to be key for the generation of non-monotone
changes to the earnings distribution.
Tax progressivity is substantially different both across countries and over time. Since the
1970s, tax levels and progressivity in the United States have fallen dramatically. Guvenen,
Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014) estimate tax schedules on OECD data for the years 1983 and
2003. Average tax rates for the US are depicted in Figure 1.1. 1 Guvenen, Kuruscu, and
Ozkan (2014) argue that high levels of taxes, and especially tax progressivity, play an
important role in shaping the earnings distribution by reducing optimal human capital
investments, particularly for the highly skilled. Taxes then compress the distribution of
earnings. Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan argue that their mechanism explains changes in
earnings inequality both across countries and over time, showing that it explains up to
two-thirds of the change in the US wage premium between 1973 and 2003.2
While Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014)’s results are suggestive, Skill-Biased Techno-
logical Change (SBTC) has been the main explanatory model of why inequality grew so
strongly over recent decades in the United States (Katz and Murphy, 1992) and elsewhere
(Berman, Bound, and Machin, 1998). According to the SBTC theory, increased supplies
of highly educated labor keep the wage premium to education down, while technological
change that is biased towards skilled labor continuously drives it up. In the 1980s the
growth of educational attainment slowed down, explaining why inequality took off. In
this type of theory, human capital is essentially considered two-dimensional, and general
equilibrium effects are the main driver.
The perhaps primary challenge to both types of models is the ‘polarization’ phenomenon:
the observation that starting in the 1980s jobs in the middle of the earnings distribution
have seen less growth in wages and employment than those at the top or bottom, both
in the US (Autor and Dorn, 2013) and across advanced economies (Goos, Manning, and
Salomons, 2014). This coincided with growth in overall earnings inequality, i.e. a growing
1Figure 1.6 in Section 3.2 plots cross-country differences in tax progressivity and the relationship to
inequality measures.
2All this is much in line with ideas from a public economics literature that considers how taxes are
set optimally when human capital is endogenous (see Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) for a static setting,
and Stantcheva (2017) for a dynamic extension). In this line of research, human capital is considered
one-dimensional, and general equilibrium effects on wages play no role. Recently, a literature has developed
that considers the original Mirrlees problem when many types interact in general equilibrium. A recent
contribution is by Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2016). The formation of types (or human capital) has
so far been taken as exogenous. The same applies to previous work by Teulings (2005), which provided a
framework for tracing out general equilibrium effects across many types.
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Figure 1.1: Average tax rates in the United States
difference between the top and the bottom. Figure 1.2 displays these phenomena for
the United States. A number of explanations have been put forward to explain what is
different about jobs in the middle of the income distribution, such as offshorability or
competition from China or declines in unionization rates in the manufacturing sector, but
consensus has formed around the view that these jobs have a higher degree of ’routineness’,
and are therefore more susceptible to automation (by machines, robots, and computers).
In short, polarization of the labor market is seen as demand-driven, and attributed to
exogenous technological forces. See Autor et al. (2010) for a review of this literature.
This paper takes an entirely different and complementary approach. It extends the analysis
of incentive changes as in Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014) to a multi-dimensional
setting, in which there is also a role for the general equilibrium effects of Katz and Murphy
(1992). Thus, it combines both of the established approaches to earnings inequality
discussed above.3
We begin our analysis with a set of empirical results. Analyzing data on occupational
skills from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) combined with Census data, this
paper establishes that there seem to be two relevant dimensions of job skills: cognitive
and manual skills, both of which can be thought of as continuous variables. We find the
3A similar setup has been used by Guvenen and Kuruscu (2010) and Guvenen and Kuruscu (2012)
to study skill-biased technological change. However, in both papers the general equilibrium wage effect
is deliberately shut off by choosing a linear production technology. This precludes interaction effects
between relative skill quantities and prices of the type we study in this paper.
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Figure 1.2: Wage Inequality Growth and Polarization in the United States
importance of these skills to be heterogeneous over the distribution of earnings: manual
skills play a relatively larger role at the bottom of the distribution, cognitive skills play a
larger role at the top. Similar to Katz and Murphy, the cognitive skills coincide heavily
with schooling decisions. We discuss the details of this analysis in Section 1.2.
Taken together, these points have important implications for the impact of tax incentives:
First, those incentives are more relevant for those at the top of the income distribution
than those at the bottom. This is because cognitive skills are subject to individual
investment – and therefore incentives – to a much larger extend than manual skills, and
because cognitive skills dominate at the top of the income distribution. Second, in general
equilibrium, a change in the relative amount of cognitive skills may affect the relative
prices of the two skill types and therefore individual earnings - a channel that is absent in
models of one-dimensional human capital, but common in the literature on SBTC.
Motivated by these empirical findings, Section 1.3 sets out a simple life-cycle model
in which earnings are derived from cognitive and manual skills, cognitive skills are
subject to endogenous investment decisions and relative wages are determined in general
equilibrium. Importantly, in our model of skills it is not different education levels that
map into different skill types as is standard in the literature.4 Instead, both skill types
4One notable exception is Lindenlaub (2017). She analyzes a matching model with multi-dimensional
skills and shows how different rates of technological change between different skills can lead to polarization.
Unlike in our model, she takes all skills as exogenously given.
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are continuous, and one of them is formed by education. In Section 1.4 we use a simpler
and more tractable representation of the model to study the effects of tax progressivity in
our setting theoretically. We emphasize two implications: inequality and polarization.
First, our mechanism impacts inequality. Just like in the uniform human capital model,
a decline in tax progressivity impacts the top of the income distribution more than the
bottom, thereby increasing income inequality in absolute terms. This is because, in typical
human capital models, the more able spend more time learning, and tax progressivity
reduces the private gains from having learned earlier in life.
Two things are different in the multi-dimensional case, causing polarization to arise. First,
the heterogeneous impact of taxes becomes much stronger, so that income inequality
also increases in relative terms. This is because lower tax progressivity increases the
relative supply of cognitive skills more than that of manual skills, thereby increasing
the latter’s relative price. This lowers incentives to acquire cognitive skills. Second, the
increasing relative price of manual skills, which are more important at the bottom of the
income distribution, makes earnings at the bottom of the distribution even less sensitive
to progressivity. If this effect is strong enough, it can even increase the wages of those
at the bottom relatively more than of those at middling levels of the distribution. In
short, the tails of the distribution potentially respond relatively stronger to changes in
tax progressivity, with a reduction in progressivity causing polarization in earnings. We
discuss the underlying mechanism in further detail in Section 1.4.
The earnings distribution is likely subject to a multitude of economic forces and no single
mechanism will be able to fully account for the changes that took place during the period
in which polarization arose. We argue that our mechanism potentially contributes in
addition to the existing mechanisms put forward in the literature, but do not claim it as
the sole driver of the observed changes. In this paper, we attempt to study our supply-side
mechanism in isolation. That limits the extent to which we can observe its empirical
implications in data. Nevertheless, we include a qualitative comparison of the model’s
macro-economic implications to data, both over countries and across time, in Section 3.2.
The model predicts non-linear patterns of (relative) change in income distributions due to
tax changes. While, as we discuss in detail, some of these patterns could also be generated
by alternative setups with one-dimensional human capital, our theoretical exposition
demonstrates that multi-dimensional models have a much easier time to account for such
movements. Using OECD data on income distributions across countries and over time, we
construct measures of income inequality and measures of tax progressivity across countries.
Patterns that are easily accounted for by our multi-dimensional model are pervasive. We
also discuss implications for changes over time, and the limitations present in verifying
these.
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Section 1.6 takes an enriched version of the model developed in Section 1.3 that can be
solved numerically. Parameters are now tied down so that the baseline version of the
enriched model matches relevant moments of the US economy. The model is then used to
study the quantitative impact of a typical decline in tax progressivity.5 In order to do so,
we use the decline of US tax progressivity since the 1980s that we discussed above as our
experiment. We calibrate the model economy to match moments from the US economy in
the early 2000s. We then compare the steady-state earnings distribution of this economy
with the counter-factual tax progressivity of 1983 to the one in 2003 and calculate the
rate of change in earnings.
The main goal of this exercise is to gauge the general quantitative “bite” of the human
capital investment channel on changes in the earnings distribution, rather than wanting
to account for the empirical change in earnings growth over the same period. This would
require at the very least taking into account the transition period as well as cohort
composition effects, both of which our model is silent on. More generally, we are looking
at our mechanism in isolation, whereas in reality several channels are likely to have played
a role in the rise of polarization. The results from the experiment indicate that the model
captures growth in overall wage inequality reasonably well. Most of the change comes
out of the upper half of the income distribution, in line with the empirical evidence. The
results further indicate that the polarization effect exists, and is quantitatively sizable
but smaller than what we observe empirically. In conclusion, our mechanism has impact
under quantitatively relevant variations in policy. We also argue why our estimate of the
mechanisms quantitative implications might be seen as a lower bound.
Our results contribute to two separate literatures. First, they provide a natural explanation
for the lack of response in the lower half of the income distribution to changes in the
human capital accumulation incentive structure. Existing papers focusing on uniform
human capital, such as Guvenen et al. (2014), lack explanatory power in this region
of the distribution. By adding the general equilibrium relative price effect, our model
complements the direct incentive effect studied in their paper with the general equilibrium
price effect. The latter works primarily in the lower half of the distribution and helps to
limit the increase in total inequality.
Second, existing theories of polarization are primarily labor demand driven. Autor and
Dorn (2013) introduce a third ’routine’ skill category and explain polarization through
5In this paper, we focus on tax progressivity. As Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan demonstrate, allowing
for flexible labor supply makes tax levels a disincentive in the accumulation of human capital as well.In
the context of a cross-country comparison, Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan find that differences in tax
progressivity are a more important determinant of differences in inequality than are differences average
tax rates, explaining our focus on the former.
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increasing automation of ’routine’-intensive tasks, reducing the demand for jobs located
in the middle of the skill distribution. By adding general equilibrium relative price effects
to the traditional skilled-unskilled dichotomy of the endogenous human capital literature,
we are able to generate qualitatively similar changes in the earnings distribution without
resorting to a third type of skill. Given the complexity of the earnings distribution,
there are likely many underlying factors at work. Consequently, we see our channel
as complementary to the skill-demand based explanations put forward in the existing
literature.
Throughout, we emphasize that taxation is just one particular type of disincentive to
human capital formation. In principle, there are many other distortions driving a wedge
between public and private returns to education that differ across parts of the population.
Two of the major trends in the 2nd half of the 20th century have been declines in gender
and race based discrimination, both in education and the labor market. Hsieh et al. (2016)
attribute about 25% of total economic growth in the US between 1960 and 2010 to changes
in discrimination against women and minorities. It also seems reasonable to think that
these trends correspond to a reduction in wedge progressivity, since discrimination seems
like a particularly salient issue towards the top of the distribution. Thus, for the remainder
of this paper, one may want to think of ‘wedges’ more generally whenever we discuss
taxes. Our quantitative results regard taxation only, so that investigating the role of
discrimination for polarization is our main suggestion for further research. Section 1.7
concludes and provides further such directions for future research.
1.2 Manual and Cognitive Skills
We use data on the skill content of a number of occupations provided by the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles. We analyze the structure of these data using a statistical technique
(Principal Compenent Analysis) that allow us to reduce the dimensionality of the data and
subsequently interpret them. We fin that skills are best summed up by two dimensions:
cognitive and manual skills, both of which are important. In order to map the skill content
into the wage distribution, we link the DOT data to the Census. This also enables us to
investigate how skill measures relate to other observables, such as education. It turns out
that the cognitive component of skills is strongly correlated to measures of education,
while the manual component is not. Below, we discuss our data sources in more detail.
Empirical methodology and results are presented thereafter.
The main drawback of our type of analysis is that we look for underlying skill categories
in the data per se, i.e. not in relation to the wages or schooling decisions we expect them
to explain. Our results in first instance only aim to have explanatory power with regards
to the questions and answers observed in the DOT. Several arguments speak for our
13
approach nevertheless. First, the clear advantage of this approach is that our measures
are in some sense still direct measures of skills, even if they are compounded and rely
on analysts. Any explanatory power they have in our further analysis is not due to how
we have produced them. Second, and related, the questions included in the DOT were
included for a reason: because they were believed to be relevant measures of occupational
skill. Last but not least, there is a related literature in which data on skills are directly
related to wages. The most important reference in this regard is Yamaguchi (2012), who
estimates a structural model of wage development in relation to unobserved skills using
the same data on occupational skills as we do. He also finds two underlying skill factors
to be of major importance, which he refers to as cognitive and motor tasks.
1.2.1 Data
DOT
We use the ‘Current Population Survey (CPS), April 1971, Augmented With DOT
Characteristics and Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)’, obtained from the IPCSR.
This version of the CPS was augmented with data on occupation characteristics from
the 4th edition of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The 4th edition of the
DOT is unique, in the sense that it is the final edition of the so-called ‘Analyst Database’.
Over centuries, starting in the mid-1930s, the United States Employment Service led an
effort to systematically document the skills required to perform a range of occupations.
This was done by sending trained occupational analysts to job sites, where they would
complete standardized questionnaires on occupation content. While the database was
revised since, the focus after the 4th edition of the DOT shifted to the generation of
O*NET data, which are based on surveys of employees and employers, and therefore
much less suitable for comparison across occupations. Following much of the literature, we
therefore choose to use the 4th edition DOT. The main advantage of using the augmented
CPS database is that it provides us with numbers of workers per occupation in the original
DOT occupation classification.
The 4th edition DOT provides information on 46 variables of skills needed for and
characteristics of 3886 DOT occupations (some examples: Marine Architect, Die-Designer
Apprentice, Weather Observer, Hypnotherapist). In the nationally representative CPS
database that we use, we also have a proportion of the working population for each of
these occupations. The 46 variables consist of the analyst’s answers to a wide variety of
questions per occupation:
1. To what extent does the job relate to data, people, things? (3 questions)
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2. What educational development is required (reasoning, mathematical, language,
vocational)? (4 questions)
3. To what extent are aptitudes like intelligence important, or finger dexterity? (11
questions)
4. What temperaments relate to some occupation? (10 questions)
5. What are the physical demands of the job? (6 questions)
6. What physical environment does the job take place in? (7 questions)
7. To what interests does the job relate? (5 questions)
The survey includes clear and detailed instructions on how to answer these questions,
making the answers comparable across occupations. In addition, many questions include
a grading scale that seemingly targets the possibility of cardinal comparison. Whether
cardinal interpretation is appropriate depends on the context, but clearly information is
lost when not using these scales in some cardinal fashion. For example, aptitude ratings
ask analysts to decide which quintile of the population an occupation falls into. On some
questions, however, analysts were only asked to indicate whether they are relevant to a
job or not. In each case, we convert the answers provided into numerical values.
Because the questions in the database vary in type and topic, and their number is large,
researchers typically make ex-ante decisions on which variables to use. For example,
while some questions clearly relate to skills, others clearly do not (such as interest and
environment variables). We try to keep any pre-selection to a minimum, and include
the three categories of questions on the DOT when we perform Principal Component
Analysis. These categories, comprising 18 questions, have in common that they must all
be answered on a numeric scale that suggests some form of cardinal interpretation. (This
is generally not true for the other categories: they are of the ‘yes or no’ type.) They also
all clearly relate to skills, rather than the environment or personal characteristics of the
typical person performing the job. We provide more detail on the 18 questions with our
empirical results.
Census
We obtain a crosswalk between DOT occupation codes and Census 1990 occupation codes
from the Analyst Resource Center (amongst others associated with the US Department of
Labor). Whenever several DOT codes map into one census code, we take the average of
component scores as the component score for that Census occupation. This procedure
results in 452 occupations.
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We use US Census data from IPUMS for all non-skill data (wages, hours worked, employ-
ment shares over Census occupations, education, and so forth), where we take a random
sample of 50 thousand observations for each of the census years we use. Non-farm hourly
wage rates are constructed by combining wage income and non-farm business income,
following the example of the Census itself, and correcting for the number of weeks worked
and the number of hours worked in a typical week. We reflate all wages to 2012 levels
using the ‘CPI total items for the United States’ from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. We remove all occupations which are not present throughout our sample, as well
as all farm occupations. The final number of occupations for which we have data in our
sample is 308.
Population percentiles are obtained as follows. For each occupation in our sample we
obtain mean hourly log wages wocc and the share of the population employed in the
respective occupation xocc. We sort occupations by their mean log hourly wage in 1980.
We construct percentile employment shares xperc and average wages wperc by mapping
the occupation population shares into population percentiles. In particular, we assign to
each percentile, the share of each occupation falling into the respective percentile using
the 1980 population share per occupation. Doing this, we obtain the following conversion
matrix C of dimensions #occ× 100, which by definition maps the vector of occupation






By construction, the population percentiles obtained in this way are 1 in 1980. Percentile
mean wages in 1980 are obtained by multiplying occupational mean wages with the
conversion matrix:
wperc1980 = C ′1980wocc1980.
To obtain the change in employment shares between 1980 and 2010, we first calculate how
occupational employment changed in terms of 1980 percentiles and then compute the rate
of change. In particular, we take the conversion matrix from occupations into percentiles
in 1980 and multiply it with the occupation employment share vector in 2010 as follows:
∆2010−1980xperc = C ′1980(xocc2010 − xocc1980).
This calculation converts 2010 occupational population shares into the 1980 percentile
bins. If for an occupation the employment share increased (decreased) relative to 1980,
this will result in the respective population percentile to increase (decrease) as well.6
6Note that by using this strategy, we are restricted to the analysis of occupations which are present in
both 1980 and 2010. Thus, we remain silent on the effects of vanishing and newly appearing occupations
on the aggregate wage and employment distribution. The procedure follows the approach taken by Autor
and Dorn (2013).
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For the calculation of changes of wages we similarly multiply the 1980 conversion matrix
with 2010 occupational mean log hourly wages and obtain the growth rate by taking the
difference of the 2010 and 1980 percentile wages.
1.2.2 Empirics
PCA
The leftmost column of Table 1.1 shows the labels of the 18 DOT questions we include
in our analysis. This set is still large, so that we want to reduce it for more tractable
empirical analysis. We think of these skills as ex-ante equally important indicators of
underlying core skills, and want to find out what these underlying skills look like. One
method that allows doing so is Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
PCA is a relatively standard technique for dimension reduction, that creates new variables
by linear combinations of existing ones. Its objective is to maximize the variance of the
new variable, which is called a principle component. Each subsequent component’s vector
of weights to the variables is assumed orthogonal to the previous ones’. (To make this
problem well-defined, variables are first standardized to have mean zero and standard
deviation one, and the total weight given to each of them is restricted to be no more
than one.) The optimality condition for this problem is a simple eigenvector-eigenvalue
decomposition, which yields as many components (eigenvectors) as there are variables, with
all components orthogonal to each other. The corresponding eigenvalues relate directly to
the variance accounted for by each component. One can simply think of the components
as new dimensions: the dimensions are rotated such that the first dimension explains as
much variance as possible, thereafter the second, and so on. Thus, the components are
identified up to sign and scaling. Variance accounted for by each component are displayed
in Figure 1.3. Clearly, the first two components dominate the others in explanatory power:
they jointly explain more than 60% of the variance in the data, while no other component
explains more than 10%. The third component and further component do not seem to
pick up a fundamentally different aspect of skills, but rather seem to modulate the first
two. Full PCA results are included in Appendix 1.A.
What do the components look like? Table 1.1 shows the correlation between the first two
components with the DOT skill measures over occupations (weighted by their share in
employment). Those questions that are negatively correlated with the first component
are highlighted. A brief study of the category groups with positive (negative) correlations
with the first (second) component unambiguously leads to the conclusion that the first
component relates to measures of cognitive ability, while the second component relates to
physical skills.
17
Figure 1.3: PCA Scree Plot
Table 1.1: Component Correlations




GED Reasoning 0.47 -0.36
GED Mathematical 0.46 -0.39
GED Language 0.48 -0.38





Form Perception 0.05 -0.09
Clerical Perception 0.53 -0.51
Motor Coordination -0.44 -0.07
Finger Dexterity -0.63 -0.14
Manual Dexterity -0.57 0.21
Eye-Hand-Foot Coord. -0.14 0.44
Color Discrimination -0.28 0.46
The orthogonality assumption inherent to the method has the natural economic inter-
pretation that these are truly different underlying skills: being good at one does not
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mechanically imply being good at another. At the same time, there can certainly still be
correlation in abilities in the population of observed occupations. In fact, the correlation
between observed occupation scores on the first two components is -0.25: those with more
cognitive ability tend to be less able physically, and vice versa.
Covariates
We investigate how the results of the principle component analysis described in the
previous relate to the wage distribution. Figure 1.4 plots the first two components over
population skill percentiles. As one would expect, the cognitive component is of minor
importance in the lower end of the skill distribution, and starts to increase in importance
somewhere below the median. In contrast, the physical component is relatively flat for the
lower half of the distribution. Above the median it continuously declines with increasing
skill level.
Figure 1.4: Components over the Distribution
Taken together, the PCA results imply that the multi-dimensionality of human capital or
skills captured in the DOT can be summarized in two main factors, which we call cognitive
and manual. As expected, the physical skill is relatively more important in the lower half
of the wage distribution, while the cognitive becomes increasingly important for the higher
skilled occupations. We view this as an interesting result, as the skilled-versus-unskilled
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dichotomy has a long tradition in the analysis of human capital.
Empirically, the skilled-versus-unskilled distinction has often been proxied for by years of
education or by comparing college educated workers to those without college education.
Figure 1.5 compares the PCA cognitive component to these traditional skill measures. It
plots the cognitive component alongside the average years of education and the share of
college graduates across wage percentiles in the population. All three measures behave
very similarly in a qualitative sense. They are systematically lower for the lower half
of the distribution and exhibit a break around the median. In the right half, all three
measures are quickly increasing. Table 1.2 presents correlations between these measures
of education and the two components, confirming the results from Figure 1.5: Education
strongly correlates with cognitive skills, but not with manual skills.
Figure 1.5: Components and Education
Table 1.2: Correlation between skill components and education measures
Correlations ‘Cognitive’ ‘Manual’
Years of Education 0.97 -0.83
College Share 0.98 -0.70
To sum up, the empirical results suggest that both manual and cognitive skills are impor-
tant, manual skills predominate in occupations at the bottom of the income distribution
while cognitive skills predominate in the upper half. Furthermore, cognitive skills are
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highly correlated with traditional measures of schooling, which suggests that the cognitive
skill is formed through education.
These observations have implications for the design of our theoretical framework. In
particular, they suggest a model of skills where both manual and cognitive skills are
important. This is much in line with the literature on Skill-Biased Technological Change,
however there is one crucial difference: In the SBTC literature, it is commonly assumed
that agents exclusively supply one type of labor, skilled or unskilled. Empirically, the most
common strategy for mapping workers to skill types is by applying a cut-off for years of
education above (below) which workers are categorized as skilled (unskilled). In contrast,
the PCA results presented above suggest that both skills are continuous, i.e. workers in
each occupation supply a bundle of cognitive and manual skills, rather than just one of the
two. This precludes the mapping from years of schooling to skill categories. We will discuss
the implications for our theoretical framework in the next Section. Importantly, skill
continuity allows for heterogeneity that is not given, but formed endogenously through
schooling.
1.3 Model
In the remainder of the paper, we will theoretically and quantitatively explore how tax
policy changes distort skill accumulation incentives and thereby impact the shape of
the earnings distribution. Motivated by the empirical evidence presented in the previous
Section, in this Section we set up a general environment in which earnings are derived from
multi-dimensional skills. Individual skills are determined by innate ability and investment
to different degrees. We describe the individual income maximization problem trading
off time in school and time at work and discuss how progressive taxation distorts this
trade-off.
1.3.1 Environment
Human capital accumulation A continuum of agents of mass one derives (pre-tax)
earnings from two skills, manual m and cognitive s, quantities of which are measured by
Hm and Hs, respectively. Human capital is accumulated by spending time in school at the
beginning of an agent’s life. Agents are active for one period of time, t ∈ [0, 1] and begin
their active period in school. They can leave at any time x ∈ [0, 1] to begin working.7
Individuals are endowed with cognitive and manual abilities α = (αs, αm). Ability α is
the only source of heterogeneity in the population. It is continuously distributed with
7When we discuss the effects of policy changes in this model, we will essentially be comparing steady
states.
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pdf f(α) over a finite and positive support [α, ᾱ]2. Based on the correlation between
schooling measures and the cognitive component discussed in Section 1.2, we assume that
the manual skill Hm is innate, i.e. it cannot be accumulated and depends only on manual
ability αm. In contrast, the cognitive skill Hs is subject to human capital accumulation or
schooling. The efficiency of schooling time depends on individual’s ability α, the amount of
human capital already accumulated and the time spent in school, according to a schooling
function s(Hs, α, t). Cognitive human capital Hs(α, x) > 0, is assumed to be a continuous
and twice differentiable function. Finally, we assume that ∂Hs(αs,x)
∂x
> 0: accumulated
human capital is a strictly positive function of time spent in school.
After quitting school, human capital stays constant for the remaining active time of the




 s(Hs, α, t), t ≤ x0, t > x (1.1)
and the amount of cognitive human capital while working is given by the level of human
capital at time x, Hs(α, x).
Multi-dimensional earnings Individuals are assumed to supply both of their skills
to the market simultaneously. Labor supply is assumed inelastic, and set to one. This
implies that each individual supplies Hm(α) units of manual labor and Hs(α, x) units of
cognitive labor when working. Instantaneous gross earnings y of an individual can now be
described as
y = wmHm(α) + wsHs(α, x). (1.2)
Here, wm and ws are wage rates for efficiency units of manual and cognitive skills, taken
as given by the agents.
On the production side of the economy, final output is produced by an aggregate production
function taking the total amounts of manual and cognitive skills in the economy as inputs,
Y = F (M,S).










Hm(α)f(α) dα = 1,
in light of the above normalization of manual skills. We assume competitive input markets,
thus wages wm and ws are given by their respective marginal products.
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1.3.2 Individual Problem
Consumption prices are taken as the numeraire. Markets are complete, there are no sources
of uncertainty, and a single asset completes the market: agents can save and borrow asset
a without limit (except for repayment at t = 1) at the discount rate: r = r̃.8 Taxes are
assumed to be paid instantaneously over the rate of income y. This is a crucial model
ingredient: in reality, tax schedules are applied yearly, which is a short frequency compared
to the length of the life cycle. In our continuous time model, we capture this by applying
the tax schedule to the wage rate at any instance.









subject to ∀t :
∂at
∂t
= −ct(1 + τc) + atr if t ≤ x,
∂at
∂t
= yt(1− τy(yt))− ct(1 + τc) + atr if t > x,
a0 = 0, a1 ≥ 0,
ct ≥ 0.
Agents decide on the duration of their education and on the life-cycle profile of consumption
and savings.
The government levies taxes on consumption and earnings, τc and τy(·), in order to
meet wasteful government spending target G. We assume that the earnings tax τy(·) is
governed by two parameters, responsible for average tax level φ and the degree of tax
progressivity θ, τy(·) = τy(· ;φ, θ). An specific example of such an earnings tax function is
τy(y) = 1 − 1φ(y)
−θ. This is the tax function we will use in our quantitative exercise in
Section 1.6.
1.4 Tax Policy, Inequality Changes and Polarization
In this Section, we study the effect of changes in the tax policy, in particular changes to
the tax progressivity θ on the shape of the earnings distribution. Investing in education
enables individuals to achieve higher earnings in a shorter time span. Recall that in our
framework, taxes are not applied to life-time income, but instead levied on instantaneous
8We do not model the capital stock of the economy in general equilibrium, which yields the same
results as an economy that is ‘small’ and open to capital only, or with an aggregate production technology
that is linear in capital.
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earnings, in order to resemble real-world income taxation. For a given life-time income,
positive tax progressivity punishes higher per-period earnings relative to an earnings
profile that spreads out lower earnings over a larger fraction of the life-cycle. Through this
channel, tax progressivity directly influences the optimal choice of time in school, x∗ and
cognitive human capital, Hs(α, x∗). Next, we will present a static version of the general
framework above. We will then define the notions of inequality and polarization in this
framework and provide conditions for the latter to arise in response to a policy change.
1.4.1 A simple static framework
Life-cycle problem (1.3) above has a straightforward solution. Since individuals can only
decide between going to school or working full-time, the amount of human capital is fully
determined by the time spent in school, x, and cognitive ability, αs. Second, because
markets are complete, agents smooth consumption and the choice of the optimal x is
unconstrained. As there are no other choices in the model, the agent now simply maximizes
lifetime after-tax income with respect to time in school:
max
x≥0
(1− x)y(1− τ(y;φ, θ)) (1.4)
subject to:
y = wm + wsHs(α, x).
For tractability, we assume that there is no heterogeneity in the manual skill, so that we
can normalize its level to one, Hm = 1. This implies that the aggregate amount of manual
skill, M is also equal to one.
In the following, we will be interested in how changes in the tax progressivity θ shape the
income distribution in this environment. As discussed, the optimal schooling decision will
be directly governed by the degree of tax progressivity. From now on, we will therefore
directly work with h(α, θ) ≡ Hs(α, x∗) instead of human capital Hs(α, x), where x∗ is the
argmax of individual income maximization problem (1.2).
1.4.2 Policy changes and earnings distribution
Our basic interest is the study of the effect of taxation on the earnings distribution in the
presence of multi-dimensional skills. To this end, we will formalize the notion of earnings
inequality and earnings polarization in our framework and provide conditions for either
of them to arise. As will become clear below, earnings polarization is a special case of
earnings inequality growth, with additional restrictions on the relative movements of
earnings within the lower tail of the distribution.
As outlined above, we will link the changes in the earnings distribution reported by
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Autor and Dorn (2013) to changes in the tax incentives to relative skill supply studied
by Guvenen et al. (2014). Thus, we will be interested in the relative (percentage change)
effects of policy on earnings, since this is the theoretical equivalent of Figure 1.2. In
particular, we will then be interested in how these policy effects differ across different


































































In the above, percentage changes in income have been separated into three terms. The first
two terms describe the potential trade-off policy created in a multi-dimensional model: on
the one hand, policies can increase (or decrease) incentives to acquire human capital, which
we call a quantity effect, but when they do so for all individuals this increases (decreases)
the overall supply of learnable skills in the economy, which can decrease (increase) their
relative price - a price effect. Both these terms would then move in the same direction, but
their relative importance and strength depends on an individual’s schooling responsiveness
to policy. This responsiveness will in principle depend on the level of the ability parameter
α, generating potentially non-linear effects of policy changes on income changes. The last
term above affects all individuals equally in percentage terms. It arises because wage
effects are described in skill premium terms, but a policy reform can also impact the
overall productivity level in an economy - hence the name level effect.
Polarization in this environment arises if relative income changes in response to a policy
change are stronger in the tails of the income distribution than in the center of the
distribution. Since in the model, income is entirely determined by ability, this is equivalent
to comparing income responses for different ability levels. Formally, inequality growth and
polarization in response to tax policy changes can be defined in terms of relative income
changes as follows.
Definition 1. Inequality Change and Polarization. Inequality change exists in response
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Definition 1 restates income inequality growth and polarization in response to a decline
in tax progressivity θ in concise terms. First, the inequality aspect, i.e. high income
individuals pulling away even further from the rest of the population, requires a stronger
relative income response to a policy change for high ability individuals than low ability
individuals. Since this effect is negative for higher levels of tax progressivity θ, the response
will be more negative for high ability individuals. Second, the non-monotonicity in the
lower tail of the income distribution distinguishes polarization from general trends in
overall inequality: low-income individuals are able to partially catch-up to medium income
individuals, while overall inequality still increases.
1.4.3 Conditions for Inequality Growth and Polarization
Our reformulation of the life-cycle problem (1.3) as income maximization problem (1.2)
allows us to establish conditions for polarization to arise in our framework. After presenting
those conditions, we will show their sufficiency for polarization to arise. The intuition for
this result can also be seen from reformulating the decomposition (1.5) in terms of tax
policy elasticities as follows:
εyθ = εwθ
w




w + h(α) + ε
LE
θ . (1.8)
Equation (1.8) rewrites the total relative earnings elasticity in terms of weighted elasticities
of the price and the quantity effect, both of which are functions of α and the level effect
,which is independent of α. Polarization can arise because the elasticity of the price effect
has the same size for all abilities, while the elasticity of the quantity effect potentially
grows in α. In addition, the weights also change in ability, since for higher ability the
share of income generated from cognitive human capital increases. Depending on the
shape of the change of elasticity of the quantity effect, we can have non-monotone changes
in relative income across abilities. In particular, if εhθ (α) is small in absolute magnitude
for small and medium α, the growing weight on the second, quantity elasticity term
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may initially decrease the absolute magnitude of overall elasticity as we move along the
earnings distribution. Only once εhθ (α) is large enough in absolute magnitude will the
absolute magnitude of the overall elasticity begin to grow in earnings.
In the following, we will make this reasoning more precise by first laying out the assumptions
sufficient for polarization to arise, and then go through the precise mechanism. The main
purpose of this exercise is to clarify and formalize the intuition just laid out.







Inequality change and polarization in Definition 1 were defined for an arbitrary interior α̂.
Definition 2 restricts, as we will see below, the interior α̂ to the ability level that under
the below assumptions minimizes (in absolute terms) the income elasticity εyθ(α).
Assumption 1. Shape of the human capital elasticity. Human capital elasticity εhθ (α)
behaves relative to the relative wage elasticity εwθ as follows for different ability levels:





< 0 and ∂
2εhθ (α)
∂α2






- For abilities α ≤ α̂, the human capital elasticity is lower in absolute terms than the
elasticity of relative prices, εhθ (α)− εwθ > 0.
- For high ability individuals, the human capital elasticity is higher in absolute terms
than the elasticity of relative prices, εhθ (α)− εwθ < 0.
Assumption 1 states that for low ability individuals, the relative price elasticity is stronger
than the quantity elasticity. The quantity elasticity is increasingly growing in ability and
for abilities high enough, it becomes larger than the relative price elasticity in absolute
terms.
Assumption 2. Human capital function. Human capital accumulation is strictly convex
and positive in α, h′α, h′′α > 0. In addition, for all α ∈ [α, α], the following restriction on
the shape of the optimal human capital quantities holds:
1




Recall from above that h(α, θ) is the cognitive human capital resulting from the optimal
schooling decision of the agent, h(α, θ) ≡ Hs(α, x∗). Therefore, Assumption 2 effectively
imposes restrictions shape of the schooling technology. In particular, it is required that
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the human capital is convex in ability, but cannot increase too quickly – h′′α has to be
sufficiently small.
Result 1. Given Assumption 1, inequality changes as defined in Definition 1 occur in
response to a change in tax policy θ. If in addition Assumption 2 also holds, polarization
as defined in Definition 1 occurs as well.
Proof: For the inequality change part, we will show that income elasticity εyθ(α) is larger
in absolute terms for α than for α. For the polarization part, we will show that under
Assumption 2, there is a unique α̂ as defined in Definition 2 and this α̂ is the argmax of
the maximum of εyθ(α) (minimum in absolute terms).
Inequality change: To show that 0 > εyθ(α) > ε
y
θ(α), we will first show that ε
y
θ(α)−εLEθ > εwθ
and second that εyθ(α)− εLEθ < εwθ . To show the former, consider
εyθ(α)− εLEθ > εwθ
⇔ εwθ
w






















⇔ εhθ (α) > εwθ ,
where the last inequality holds by Assumption 1. For the high ability case εyθ(α)−εLEθ < εwθ ,
a similar argument holds. Together, this implies that εyθ(α) − εLEθ > εwθ > ε
y
θ(α) − εLEθ .
εyθ(α) > ε
y
θ(α) is implied by the last inequalities, establishing inequality change as defined
in equation (1.6) from Definition 1.
Polarization: To show that the unique global maximum of εyθ(α) is at α̂, we show first that
α̂ is the only extremum, and second that the first derivative is strictly larger (smaller)































is strictly declining in α,
positive for α and negative for α. Define α̃ as the α such that εhθ (α̃)− εwθ = 0. Note that
by Assumption 1 α > α̃ > α̂ holds. Assumption 2 implies that wh
′
α
(w+h)2 is strictly decreasing
in α and strictly positive. Together this implies that the left-hand side is strictly declining
in α for α < α̃, positive for α < α̃ and negative for α > α̃. For the right-hand side,
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is ≈ 0 for α and strictly increasing and positive for all
α > α.










< 0. Furthermore, since the left-
hand side is strictly declining while positive and the right-hand side strictly increasing





= 0. This proves the existence of











< 0, α̂ is a global maximum. Since α̂ ∈ (α, α), this
establishes polarization as defined in equation (1.7).
The aim of this Section has been to detail conditions on the price and quantity effects for
earnings polarization to arise in our framework with two types of skills and general equi-
librium price effects. We show that depending on the shape of the elasticities, polarization
can arise in our framework of two-dimensional skills and general equilibrium skill price
effects. In the following, we will first present some reduced-form cross-country evidence
for our mechanism in the next Section, and then try to quantify the economic importance
of this supply-side channel in a richer version of our model in Section 1.6.
1.5 Models versus Data
1.5.1 Across Countries
Tax systems differ in progressivity across countries (Figure 1.6). Our model makes clear
predictions on the role of progressivity in income inequality: more progressive tax systems
produce less inequality as measured by relative earnings in the income distribution. This
is driven by changes in the upper half of the income distribution, while inequality in the
bottom half varies little with tax progressivity. Neither prediction is made by a model
with one-dimensional skills, nested in our setup.9 We now investigate these predictions in
cross-country data, for which we need measures of tax progressivity and relative earnings
inequality.
Coen-Pirani (2017) sets forth a method to obtain measures of tax progressivity from
OECD data, which works as follows: If we assume that both gross and net earnings
are log-normally distributed and that taxes follow the functional form assumed above,
measured Gini coefficients of gross and net earnings can be used to back out an estimate
of θ. A panel data set of Gini coefficients is available from the OECD Income Distribution
Database. We use data on the working age population (ages 18 to 65), using the income
9We think of tax systems as exogenous to the remainder of the economy. If tax progressivity is in some
way a response to higher earnings inequality, this would counteract our mechanism and make it harder to
find a correspondence between theory and data.
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definition that the OECD followed until 2011 for better availability and comparability of
data. Data are available for about 30 OECD member countries, covering a period from
the mid 1970s to 2015. Coverage is thin for earlier years, but improves towards the end of
the sample. Because the panel is rather unbalanced, we average the resulting measures of
tax progressivity for the years 2010–2015, and use this as a cross-section of country-level
tax progressivity.
Also available from the OECD is an unbalanced panel of relative earnings inequality
measures across countries and over time. The underlying population are full-time employees
of either gender. These include the earnings ratio of the 90th percentile cut-off to the
50th percentile cut-off, or 90-50 ratio, and the same for the 50th and 10th percentile, the
50-10 ratio. While these two measures describe relative inequality above and below the
median, the resulting 90-10 ratio measures inequality. We choose to use these measures
because their movement has a close correspondence to what we consider in our theoretical
exposition: if relative (percentage) changes are the same across the distribution, then
these measures will remain unchanged with tax progressivity. We again average over the
years 2010–2015. The overlap between the two datasets consists of 32 countries.
Next, we estimate the (linear) impact of tax progressivity on earnings inequality at
different points in the distribution. Results of OLS regressions of the latter on the former
are displayed in Table 1.3. Figure 1.6 presents the results graphically. Tax progressivity is
generally associated with a reduced relative earnings inequality. For the 90-10 ratio, the
slope is statistically significant at the 5% level. For the 90-50 ratio the slope is statistically
significant at the 1% level. For the 50-10 ratio, the slope is not statistically significant,
even at the 10% level. While tax progressivity has quite some explanatory power in the
upper half of the distribution, as measured by the R2, this is not true for the lower half of
the distribution.
Table 1.3: Regression results
Inequality measure
90-10 ratio 90-50 ratio 50-10 ratio
Progressivity φ1 -1.17 -1.92 -0.19
(0.54) (0.59) (0.41)
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32 32 32
R2 0.14 0.26 0.01
All these results align very well with our model prediction, even as we are looking at simple
linear relations. In a more extensive quantitative exercise, Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan
(2014) analyze the responses of a one-dimensional model of human capital to changes in
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Figure 1.6: Tax progressivity and Inequality across Countries
tax progressivity. Their model has several added features, such as flexible labor supply,
and a more flexible functional form for average tax rates. While they show that their
model does well in accounting for 90-10 ratios, it is less succesful in disentangling 50-10
ratios. Our analysis suggests that this is due to the multi-dimensional nature of skills,
which is most relevant to the bottom half of the distribution. It also suggests that the
productivity effect of taxes on human capital may be mitigated by general equilibrium
effects.
1.5.2 Over Time
Tax progressivity in the United States has declined dramatically since the 1970s (Figure
1.1). That same observation applies to many other countries (Guvenen, Kuruscu, and
Ozkan, 2014). What implications would this have had for other observables, in particular
changes to the shape of the earnings distribution? The literature review above already
shows that the earnings distribution is shaped by a number of different forces. That fact
significantly limits the extent to which we can verify the direct impact of tax changes
on inequality through our mechanism empirically. Nevertheless, we attempt to provide a
qualitative discussion.
Educational decisions are decisions for the long run. Agents expectations of future policies
are therefore key to the empirical mechanism we describe, and observed transitions may
be slow. In any case, one would expect that younger cohorts react more strongly to
incentives than older ones, so that empirically it should be the younger cohorts that cause
polarization. This is indeed what the empirical literature finds. Cortes, Jaimovich, and
Siu (2017) document that the fall in what they call ‘routine’ occupations in the middle
of the distribution can be largely attributed to two groups: young and prime-aged men
with low levels of education where it comes to ‘routine manual’ occupations, and young
and prime-aged women with intermediate levels of education where it comes to ‘routine
cognitive’ occupations. In terms of age structure, this lines up well with the implications of
our mechanism. While our model does not speak to gender per se, the gender differences
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these authors highlight underline our main suggestion for further research: changes in
labor market discrimination may be important. We will come back to this in more detail
in the concluding Section 1.7.
Implications of changes in tax incentives for wages are summarized by rising inequality, in
gross wages and even more so net of taxes, and polarization. While these phenomena can
also be observed in the data, their underlying components cannot. This is because observed
wages are the product of human capital quantities and prices. Did wage inequality grow
due to greater differences in human capital or due to rising prices for the highly skilled?
Our mechanism would suggest the former. The theory of Skill-Biased Technological Change
on the other hand takes growth of educational attainment at face value as a measure of
human capital quantities, and interprets its slow-down as a reason for rising prices for the
highly skilled.
Separating human capital quantities from their price is a central empirical challenge in the
labor literature and existing evidence is scarce. One approach is to identify an age in the
life-cycle at which human capital is unlikely to change much, and attribute wage changes
at that age to changes in the price of human capital. This is the approach followed by
Bowlus and Robinson (2012). These authors do not find large changes in prices at all,
attributing changes in the wages of different educational groups to changes in human
capital. This would be more in line with our mechanism than for example SBTC, although
to cause polarization on its own our general equilibrium effect would require a growing
relative price of manual versus cognitive skills. Price estimates by such skill types are
unfortunately unavailable.
Similar caveats apply to direct measures of human capital (such as schooling attainment),
measured skill premia, and before and after tax returns to schooling. While our model
makes predictions for each of these, it is not clear what is the relevant empirical counterpart.
A number of possible comparisons are further complicated by the fact that our model is
not a growth model, so that it cannot account for longer-run trends in these data.
Finally we return to our initial comment: our mechanism is unlikely to have been the
only relevant change during the period. Other explanations focus on secular technological
developments that have shaped the wage distribution through changes in labor demand.
These explanations are complementary to ours as long as relative prices of skills move
in the same direction as in our model. That holds for the literature that describes how
middling ‘routine’ occupations are more prone to automation. The same applies to papers
that explain the growth of service occupations at the bottom of the distribution through
changes in demand. SBTC fits our model less well, since it starts with the assumption
that it is prices of human capital that have caused inequality to grow. Future research
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will hopefully shed further light on this debate.
After having discussed evidence for some general predictions of our framework, next we
will present a quantitative version and subsequently use it for a more formal investigation
of the quantitative relevance of our mechanism.
1.6 An Enriched Model
In this Section, we extend our model to include heterogeneity in manual (non-learnable)
skills and choose some functional forms. We then parameterize our model to reproduce
several key stylized facts of the US economy, and use it to evaluate counter-factual policies.
1.6.1 Model Description
A continuum of agents, whose total mass equals one, live for t ∈ [0, 1], first goes to school
until t = x and then works. When in school (x ≤ t), individuals build learnable human






= 0. This function resembles more conventional human capital functions
such as the one due to Ben-Porath (1967), but the time-in-school structure keeps the
model computationally simple. Time in school is more productive for the more able and
educated, but diminishes over time. hs,0 is assumed linear in αs, so that the two are
perfectly correlated. This simplifies the problem significantly at little cost. Non-learnable
human capital is given by hm,t = hm,0 = αm. Both skills are assumed to be independently
drawn from normal distributions (winsorized at three standard deviations from the mean),
resulting in a tuple (αm, αs) for each individual. When working (x > t), individuals derive
income from both types of human capital:
yt = wmhm,t + wshs,t. (1.11)
From here on out, the individual problem is the same as in equation (1.3) above. We
consider overlapping generations such that the population distribution is always in steady
state. Let the distribution of type tuples (αm, αs) ∈ A be denoted by λ. Define human












hs,tI[t>x] dλ dt. (1.13)
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Aggregate production takes place using the following production function:
Y = F (Hm, Hs) = A
[




The elasticity of substitution between the two inputs is given by 11−ρ , and γ is a share
parameter. We normalize output so that A = 1.
A government sets taxes τc and τn(·). Its budget is balanced by expenditures G that are




ctτc + ytτn(yt)I[t>x] dλ dt = G. (1.15)




decision rules for x, {ct}t∈[0,1] ∀ (αm, αs) ∈ A
such that given the parameters of the model the following holds:
- individual decision rules solve problem (1.3)






ct dλ dt (1.16)
- labor markets clear (equations (1.12) and (1.13))
- wages equal marginal products (of equation (1.14))
- and the government budget constraint is balanced (equation (1.15)).
1.6.2 Parameterization
Equilibria of the economy are found numerically. Parameters are set to match moments
of the data in the early 2000s. In doing so, the following parameterizations of initial
abilities and human capital stocks is used. Let α̃s denote a standard normal distribution,
winsorized at three standard deviations.
αs = µs + σsα̃s, (1.17)
hs,0 = 1 + (α̃s − α̃s)ψs. (1.18)
αs is the lowest level of αs. The lowest level of hs,0 is normalized to 1, while average
learning ability, the spread in learning ability, and the spread in initial learnable human
capital is controlled by parameters. Likewise,
hm,0 = 1 + (αm − αm)ψm, (1.19)
34
where αm is standard normal and ψm controls the spread of initial non-learnable human
capital.
Table 1.4: Parameters and moments
Parameter Value Moment Model Data
σ 2.857 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.350 0.350
ψm 0.141 Earnings variance at start of working life versus overall 0.528 0.500
ψs 28.068 Gini coefficient of gross earnings 0.346 0.440
µs 0.947 Average share of working age spent in school 0.030 0.034
σs 0.225 Variance of share in school 0.002 0.002
β 0.858 Share with zero education after age 18 0.478 0.456
ρ 0.286 Elasticity of substitution in production 1.400 1.400
γ 0.519 Non-learnable share of output 0.248 0.250
Table 1.4 reports data moments. Some of our model parameters are straightforwardly
informed by moments of the data, while for others much less clear-cut measures are
available. We use the midpoint of the range of elasticities of intertemporal substitution
reported in Havránek (2015) to set the same in the model (σ), but that parameter does
not influence any of the results we report. The spread of both initial human capitals is
important for overall earnings variation, and their relative size helps determine the extent
to which that variation is present at age 0. Thus, we target the Gini coefficient of gross
earnings as reported by the OECD for the year 2000. We also target a ratio of earnings
variance at age 0 versus earnings variance overall of 1/2. While we do not have a precise
estimate for this number from the data, research using the life-cycle of earnings Huggett,
Ventura, and Yaron (2011) suggests about two thirds of earnings are pinned down after
tertiary education. Finally, to determine the average and spread of ability, we target the
share of a potential 48 years of working life from age 18 that is spent in school (i.e. college
and beyond), the variance of these shares, and the share of pupils who do not spend any
time in college. We calculate the data moments from the 2000 Census sample described in
the above, where all education beyond 12th grade is counted as taking place during the
adult life cycle.
Finally, the parameters in the production function are key to size general equilibrium
responses. Unfortunately, no reduced form results on general equilibrium effects between
skills as we describe them are available. Instead, we rely on evidence on general equilibrium
effects between college educated and non-college educated labor. Here, a large body of
evidence suggests an elasticity of substitution of about 1.4 (see for example Katz and
Murphy (1992) and Ciccone and Peri (2005)). Because these two groups would both use
either type of human capital, we take the view that this is a very conservative estimate
of the two elasticity of substitution that is relevant to our model. To tie down the share
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parameter of the production technology, we target the share of non-learnable human
capital in output. Again, no direct evidence is available, so that we tentatively set this
target to 25%.
Consumption taxes are set to 7.5%, following the 2003 Figure reported in McDaniel
(2007). We estimate the tax function used in the above from tax rates at different levels of
average US earnings for 2003, and then do the same for 1983, following Guvenen, Kuruscu,
and Ozkan (2014) (we use the same data as those authors). This results in an estimate
φ1 = 0.119 for 2003, which is used for parameterizing the model, and an estimate of
φ1 = 0.188 for 1983, which we use in our counter-factual analysis below. φ0 is set to clear
the government’s budget constraint.
Table 1.4 also demonstrates the model’s ability to match the data. Overall, model moments
are close to data moments, although the model does struggle to create sufficient earnings
heterogeneity to match the economy’s inequality levels.
1.6.3 Results
To analyze the results of tax progressivity, we compare the steady state earnings distribu-
tion of the 1983 estimate of φ1 to the steady state distribution with the 2003 estimate.
We think of this as a counter-factual reform in which tax progressivity was reduced. The
procedure yields a reform that is per definition realistic, both in shape and magnitude.
We would not want to argue that our results are empirical in the sense that they have
bearing on the change in the period. (For that to be the case, one would want to consider
other factors, as well as the transition from one steady state to another.) Rather, we are
looking for a counter-factual experiment that gives us a feeling for the effect sizes in our
model.
We then turn to measures of inequality. Indeed, reducing the progressivity parameter
has increased the 90-10 ratio about one-for-one, which is what we also find in our cross-
country analysis. This increase can be almost entirely attributed to the upper half of
the distribution i.e. the 90-50 ratio. Again, this is entirely in line with our cross-country
findings. These results give us confidence that the model adequately captures the reaction
of the earnings distribution to tax progressivity.
Figure 1.7a shows the results graphically (labeled ‘baseline’). It is apparent that some
polarization occurs, but little: the bottom wages grow a few tenths of percent more than
those with the lowest wage growth. The top grows by almost 7% more than the lowest
point.10 To bear out polarization given the large increase in inequality in the top half, we
10For those interested, we report that this is 6% and 45%, respectively, of the equivalent empirical
change in the period. As already noted, we do not want to encourage such empirical interpretations too
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show the same graph but restricted to the lower half of percentiles in Figure 1.7b.
There are a number of reasons why one might consider the effect sizes we present conser-
vative. First, the elasticity of substitution between the two skill types may be smaller in
practice, leading to larger price effects: the elasticity has been measured in the previous
literature using data on college versus non-college educated labor. However, that catego-
rization is a noisy measure of the underlying skills that our theory predicts is relevant.
This would lead to an overestimation of the elasticity in a typical regression methodology
(e.g. in that of Katz and Murphy (1992)) due to attenuation bias, reducing the price effect
(which goes to zero as the elasticity goes to infinity). Second, we have not included leisure,
which works as an amplifying mechanism (cf. Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014)).
Third, our view of human capital is a very limited one, because we only focus on time
in formal schooling. The same incentives would however also affect learning during the
life-cycle, making the overall impact much larger. In addition, in this paper we are focusing
on the part of the labor wedge originating exclusively from income taxation. There exist
other sources for the labor wedge, in particular discrimination. Since this is outside the
current model, we will postpone a detailed discussion of this to the concluding Section
1.7. Finally, potentially also the share of output the model attributes to manual skills,
γ, is driving out results. However, we know little about it’s empirical counterpart - this
becomes a suggestion for further research. To investigate the importance of the manual
skills share for our results, in the next subsection we will conduct a formal sensitivity
analysis of the respective parameter, γ. As will become clear, sensitivity is relatively small.
This is reassuring, as it implies that our results are relatively robust to changes in γ.
1.6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The main moment of which we are uncertain is the one informing γ, the share of output
that is contributed by non-learnable skills. At the same time, this parameter is obviously
crucial in assessing the importance of our mechanism: in the absence of non-learnable
skills output, the model collapses to a uniform human capital model. To make this clear,
we re-calibrate the model setting the moment for γ to zero, which results in γ = 0 (and
slight changes to some of the other parameters). Figures 1.7a and 1.7b also show the
results in this case (labeled ‘one-dimensional’). While the result is similar for overall
inequality, polarization has disappeared. The effect on inequality within the bottom half
of the population is now much more straight-forward.11
much.
11The ‘one-dimensional’ graph in Figure 1.7b appears to display a kink that is not actually there:
investment in education is always non-zero due to an Inada condition in human capital formation. The
visual effect arises because levels of the human capital distribution have been compressed to a percentile
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Figure 1.7: Relative earnings change under counter-factual reform
(a) Full distribution
(b) Lower half of the distribution
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We provide a more formal analysis of the sensitivity of γ in the remainder of this Section.
Our parameters can be interpreted as estimates of an indirect inference procedure: They
are the result of minimizing the distance between the data moments described in Table
1.4, the vector of which we will now call ŝ, and the model moments that we will call s(θ)
(where θ is the vector of parameters). Defining ĝ = ŝ− s(θ), we then used θ to minimize
ĝ′Iĝ (where I is the identity matrix that we use as weights) and reported the argmin θ̂ of
our problem in Table 1.4.
Andrews, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017) establish a methodology for measuring the
sensitivity of parameter estimates to estimation moments. They suggest reporting an
estimate of the matrix Λ = −(G′WG)−1G′W , where G is the Jacobian of the probability
limit of ĝ at the true parameter values θ0, and W is the weighing matrix (the identity
matrix in our case). The advantage of their method is that it is computationally simple
to find a point estimate of G, and therefore Λ: because our objective vector ĝ is additive
and only s(θ) depends on the parameters, we can simply calculate the numeric Jacobian
matrix S of our model moments s(θ) at the estimated parameter value θ̂. In short, we
have that our sensitivity estimate is given by Λ = S−1.
How should these sensitivity estimates be interpreted? Entry λij of Λ tells us, roughly,
how large the local impact of a change in data moment j is on parameter i. It can be used
to calculate the asymptotic bias in our estimates associated with an alternative hypothesis
on the data moments, as long as the alternative is sufficiently close to the data moments
we report. More straightforwardly, it can be used to verbally discuss the sensitivity of
our estimates to the data moments. That is a particularly appealing feature in light of
the uncertainty around some of the data moments that we report above. Because a unit
change in the data moments is not always easy to interpret, we instead opt to report
results relevant to a 1% change of each data moment. This is achieved by multiplying λij
by a percent of data moment j. The results are in Table 1.5.
Two parameters, σ and ρ, are only sensitive to the one moment on which they depend by a
closed-form relation (the latter’s sensitivity measure is zero in the table due to round-off).
ψs takes on larger values, and so is generally more responsive in level terms. ψm and ψs
react most heavily to moments that describe the distribution of earnings and schooling.
As we would hope, parameters describing learning ability and the formation of human
capital indeed react most strongly to those moments that describe the distribution of
schooling. The parameter γ reacts strongly to the 5th moment, the variance of schooling,
which clearly plays an important role in the determination of the model’s parameters.
As discussed above, we have very little information about the ‘non-learnable share of
scale.
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Table 1.5: Sensitivity Analysis
Moment nr. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
σ -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ψm 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 0.51 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
ψs 0.00 50.95 335.41 -566.61 1901.24 -23.21 -2.41 129.65
µs 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.29 4.45 0.01 0.00 0.02
σs 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.19 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
β 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.01
ρ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.02
Note: Model moments are 1 – Elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, 2
– Earnings variance at start of working life versus overall, 3 – Gini
coefficient of gross earnings, 4 – Average share of working age spent in
school, 5 – Variance of share in school, 6 – Share with zero education
after age 18, 7 – Elasticity of substitution in production, 8 – Manual
human capital share of output. See also Table 1.4.
output’, γ, which is the eighth and last data moment in Table 1.5 above. It turns out
that this parameter does play some role in the determination of γ, albeit not a large one.
That there is some sensitivity is quite in line with our expectation, given the analysis
included above where we set γ = 0. The fact that the sensitivity is not extremely large is
reassuring, since it implies that our results would relatively little if our target of γ was
somewhat off. We remain with the conclusion that the importance of manual skills in the
overall economy is an important determinant of the strength of our mechanism, but that
we unfortunately know little about it.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the effect of tax incentives on cognitive skills, in a model where
(learnable) cognitive and (non-learnable) manual skills jointly produce earnings. It has
also attempted to argue why this is a relevant view of the labor market, combining general
equilibrium elements from the literature on skill-biased technological change and incentive
elements from the literature on human capital formation. In doing so, it has provided an
alternative mechanism through which labor market polarization may arise.
In the paper we focus exclusively on the part of the labor wedge originating from taxation.
An important additional source of the labor wedge originates from discrimination. Over
the second half of the 20th century (labor market) discrimination against women and
non-white groups arguably decreased a lot. There is growing evidence that the decline
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in discrimination has been quantitatively important for US macroeconomic outcomes.
Dwyer (2013) provides evidence that polarization in employment has been driven to a
substantial part by women increasingly entering the labor market, primarily in the tails
of the distribution. Hsieh et al. (2016) estimate that about 25% of US output per capita
growth between 1960 and 2010 can be attributed to an improved allocation of talent due
declines in discrimination in the labor market and in access to education. Decreasing the
price of education for a substantial share of the working population would have a similar
effect as the decline in tax progressivity, by increasing the relative payoff of spending
time in school. Similarly, if declines in discrimination take place in the form of ’breaking
the glass ceiling’, they might over-proportionally improve labor market outcomes for
high-earning women, again resembling declines in tax progressivity. Potentially, these
results therefore imply that the decline of progressivity of the effective labor wedge has
been a lot larger than the decline in the explicit tax wedge. In this case, our results present
a definitive lower bound on the supply-side polarization channel discussed here.
Future research may lead in a number of directions. First, fundamental questions on our
model of the labor market remain of interest. For example, credibly exogenous variation
in skill levels might illuminate the prices paid for different levels (or bundles) of skills.
Second, further research into the distributional effects of reduced discrimination against
minority groups in the labor market seems warranted. Finally, while the emphasis in this
paper has been on positive implications, one might ask what optimal tax and education
policies look like in a model like ours. In the presence of general equilibrium effects, tax
disincentives to the formation of human capital are more harmful than is traditionally
assumed, likely warranting less progressive tax schedules.
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1.A PCA Results
The table below displays the full PCA results. Each column represents the correlation
between a component and the original variables. The table begins with the component










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The WTO Government Procurement
Agreement as a Commitment
Device: A First Economic Appraisal
This Chapter is joint work with Bernard Hoekman. It has been previously published as
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 13266.1
Abstract
This paper presents novel reduced form evidence on the association between international
trade agreements that include disciplines on public procurement practices – reflected in the
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) – and public sector imports following the 2008 financial crisis. The results are
suggestive of such international disciplines acting as an effective commitment device: GPA
membership is associated with a significantly higher import share following the 2008
financial crisis than is observed for countries that are not members. We also find evidence
that the GPA and PTAs that cover public procurement are partial substitutes.
1We are grateful to Doug Nelson, Peter Egger, Matteo Fiorini, Joe Francois, Dennis Quinn, Alan
Winters and participants in the workshop Policies, Politics and Corporate Dimensions of Globalization,
May 21-22, 2018 for helpful comments and suggestions. We are especially indebted to Anirudh Shingal for
sharing data. The project leading to this paper has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon
2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 770680.
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2.1 Introduction
Public procurement constitutes a large market in all economies, comprising more than
10 percent of GDP in many countries (Djankov, Islam and Saliola, 2016). As has been
documented extensively, governments generally source a smaller share of the goods and
services they purchase from foreign countries and foreign firms than the private sector
does (Breton and Salmon, 1995; Evenett and Hoekman, 2005; Shingal, 2015). This ‘home
bias’ provides an incentive for countries to negotiate disciplines on public procurement in
international trade agreements. Examples include the plurilateral WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement (GPA), as well as, increasingly, bilateral or regional preferential
trade agreements (PTAs). The inclusion of government procurement practices in trade
agreements is relatively recent. Government procurement was excluded from the original
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. It was not until the late 1970s
that the first iteration of the GPA was negotiated. This covered just a subset of GATT
contracting parties, something that continues to be the case under the WTO. Inclusion of
public procurement in PTAs is even more recent. Until the early 1990s, most PTAs did
not cover procurement.
In this paper we assess the relationship between participation in international trade
agreements that include government procurement disciplines and public sector imports
following the 2008 financial crisis. Our focus is on the WTO GPA and the subset of
PTAs that include public procurement provisions. We investigate whether countries that
have made commitments on public procurement practices maintain higher levels of public
sector openness after the 2008 financial crisis than countries that have not done so. Our
hypothesis is that governments are likely to have greater incentives to steer public funds
towards domestic economic operators following a major shock to aggregate demand. An
implication is that we expect to observe a difference in the public procurement behavior
of countries depending on whether they have signed binding (and enforceable) agreements
not to discriminate against foreign companies when procuring products.
We find a statistically significant difference in the behavior of GPA members versus non-
GPA signatories, with GPA countries maintaining higher levels of public sector openness
in the post-crisis period. We also find indicative evidence that PTAs with procurement
disciplines may partially act as a substitute for the GPA. To our knowledge this is the first
empirical analysis of the role of the GPA as a commitment device and the first to consider
the interaction between GPA membership and PTA-based mechanisms to discipline public
procurement policies.
The existing policy literature on the relationship between trade agreements and public
procurement focuses primarily on the extent which the GPA and PTAs provisions increase
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access to procurement markets by evaluating the legal texts (coverage) of trade agreements.
The limited empirical literature tends to explore whether negotiated commitments to
reduce discrimination against foreign products lead to greater foreign sourcing. The basic
finding is that although agreements have gradually increased the coverage of public pro-
curement they do not appear to increase foreign sourcing (e.g.,Rickard and Kono, 2014).2 A
growing literature on international trade policy stresses the potential role of international
agreements in curbing policy uncertainty and thereby facilitating international trade,
especially in periods of economic distress (Carballo, Handley and Limão, 2018).3 Curbing
international policy uncertainty provides an alternative economic impact channel for the
GPA.
The 2008 financial crisis constituted a major exogenous shock that permits analysis of the
role, if any, played by inclusion of procurement-related disciplines in trade agreements.
The shock generated pressures on governments to use fiscal policy to support domestic
activity, including through government demand, and therefore can be expected to have
increased the incentives for government agencies to allocate procurement expenditures
to local firms to support local employment.4 From the point of view of potential foreign
bidders, this shift in home-bias potentially acts as an increase in uncertainty regarding
the prospects of success in bidding for contracts. The post-crisis period therefore provides
a natural experiment to assess whether countries that are members of the GPA and (or)
that have signed PTAs with public procurement provisions (PP-PTAs) display different
behavior from countries that are unconstrained by such agreements. More specifically, the
crisis allows for a test of the commitment function of trade agreements.
We use data on aggregate public import shares constructed from the World Input Output
database (WIOD) for the 2000-2014 period. The resulting public import penetration (PIP)
2One possible reason for this may be that procurement agreements do little to change actual applied
policies but are used primarily to bind or ‘lock-in’ status quo policies. If so, they are unlikely to have
substantial effects in increasing effective market access and thus drive changes in sourcing patterns. More
generally, the impact of the GPA has been difficult to identify empirically because membership has largely
been invariant over the time period for which data are available. Moreover, many of the countries that
joined the GPA in the 1990s and 2000s were European, and signing the GPA was a corollary of accession
to the European Union. This makes it very difficult if not impossible to distinguish the GPA effect from
the broader regime shift that occurred for the countries concerned.
3Francois and Martin (2004) is an early contribution highlighting the role that policy commitments
in trade agreements can play in influencing investment decisions of firms by reducing uncertainty. More
recently, Handley (2014) and Handley and Limão (2015, 2017) provide estimates of the effects of such
uncertainty reduction.
4Other papers in the procurement literature have found that home bias increases in recessions – see
e.g., Shingal (2015). Evenett and Shingal (2016) document a variety of measures taken by countries
post-2008 to allocate more procurement expenditures to local firms.
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measure is based on the public consumption category of final use in national accounts,
disaggregated at the country-industry level. While the aggregate nature of the data
imposes limitations, e.g. some elements of the flows are based on imputations, the data are
internationally consistent and allow an initial investigation whether binding commitments
on public procurement policies appear to be effective. We run a set of cross-country panel
regressions with country fixed effects and a variety of controls. The results suggest that
GPA membership is associated with less change in average PIP levels post-crisis, and
significantly higher PIP levels. This finding is robust to controlling for the number and
depth of PP-PTAs. While the results are not driven by exogenous variation, limiting
the causal interpretability of the results, they lend some credence to the interpretation
that the GPA was instrumental in sustaining levels of public sector openness. Given that
comparable evidence is largely absent in the literature, we view the results as a useful
first step in assessing the role that trade agreements can play as a policy commitment
(uncertainty reduction) mechanism.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the extant literature on
international policy agreements and the effects of the GPA. Section 3 describes the data
used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the methodology and presents the results.
Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Background and Literature Review
In this Section, we briefly review some of the salient literature on trade policy, trade
agreements and public procurement, the WTO GPA and the evolution of PP-PTAs.
2.2.1 Trade policy and trade agreements
Three broad rationales for trade agreements have been developed in the literature. One
centers on market access as a mechanism to reduce terms of trade externalities created by
national trade policies that are set non-cooperatively. The basic argument is that countries
seek to negotiate away the negative terms-of-trade spillovers generated by the imposition
of trade restrictions in partner countries (Bagwell and Staiger, 2002). Another strand of
literature argues that trade agreements offer a mechanism (independent of terms-of-trade
considerations) to governments that want to adopt policies that are not politically feasible
to implement or maintain as a result of time inconsistency or credibility problems (e.g.,
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998). By committing to rules that constrain policy choice,
governments can make policy reforms more credible. A third perspective stresses political
economy drivers (e.g., Ethier, 2007) and the premise that governments seek to maximize
political support. Assuming that governments put greater weight on prospective losses
for groups in society than on the expected gains from liberalization (Deardorff, 1987),
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governments have incentives to impose or maintain protection because this raises the
incomes of the groups from which they derive political support. If foreign governments
can be induced to liberalize, however, in the context of a trade agreement, that provides
a direct gain for existing exporters and shift the balance of domestic political support
towards liberalization.5
A corollary of all these potential rationales for a trade agreement is that they reduce policy
uncertainty for firms and traders. This is because agreements entail binding commitments
on current policies and future trade policy changes. If exporting entails sunk investment
costs upon market entry, the exporting decision will have a dynamic component and the
expected return will be a function of expected future trade policy. Even a commitment not
to exceed a certain level of protection (as is the case with tariff bindings) that is well above
actually applied protection has value by limiting the prospects of confronting high trade
barriers in a future state of the world. Thus, trade agreements establish an upper bound
on the downside risk confronted by traders and investors (Francois and Martin, 2004).
By reducing the maximum potential level of protectionism, international agreements play
a role in removing the option value of waiting to resolve policy uncertainty, which may
trigger investment in tradable activities even in the absence of actual changes in policy.
The role of international agreements as a mechanism to lower policy uncertainty becomes
especially salient during periods of economic distress, when governments are more prone
to consider discrimination against foreign products. Recent research by Handley and
Limão has demonstrated the empirical salience of this dimension of trade agreements.
Investigating the impact of accession to the WTO by Australia in 1996, Handley (2014)
finds that the accompanying reduction in trade policy uncertainty substantially reduced
barriers to entry and that exporter product variety growth would have been 7% lower
in the absence of the WTO tariff bindings. Handley and Limão (2015) investigate the
effect of Portugal becoming a member of the European Community (EC) in a structural
dynamic model with sunk export costs. Their model attributes a large fraction of the
observed growth in Portuguese exporting firms to the removal of future policy uncertainty
associated with adoption of the EC common commercial policy. Handley and Limão (2017)
find large effects also for the US, following the accession by China to the WTO in 2001,
taking into account general equilibrium effects on prices. Overall, an emerging body of
evidence suggests that the effects of policy uncertainty on firms’– investment decisions
can be large, that international agreements can play an important role in reducing trade
policy uncertainty, and that this is associated with substantial economic gains for the
participating economies.
5The various theories that have been developed to explain the role of trade agreements are surveyed
and summarized in Grossman (2016).
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2.2.2 The GPA and PTAs with procurement provisions
Public procurement was excluded from the GATT and older vintage PTAs because it was
regarded as a state activity as opposed to a commercial one. Procurement gradually came
to be covered by trade agreements because of the magnitude of the associated markets.
These motivated pursuit of reciprocal reductions in the incidence of explicit discriminatory
policies that impede market access opportunities for foreign firms. The first version of the
GATT GPA entered into force in 1981. It was revised several times subsequently to expand
its coverage. At the time of writing, there are 19 parties to the agreement, counting the
EU-28 as one, so that the GPA covers 47 WTO members.6 The agreement is a so-called
plurilateral agreement in that it binds only signatories. The benefits of membership are
restricted to signatories (Evenett and Hoekman, 2005).
The main discipline imposed by the GPA is that covered government entities are prohibited
from discriminating against or between foreign products and firms (bidders) in the award
of procurement contracts that exceed certain value thresholds. The obligation extends
not only to imports but also to subsidiaries of locally established foreign firms. As foreign
direct investment (FDI) is an important channel for firms to contest procurement markets,
this is an important feature of the GPA. The agreement has extensive provisions aimed at
ensuring that firms can become aware of procurement opportunities, that the process is
transparent, and that competitive procurement methods be used in selecting and awarding
contracts. There are numerous provisions that aim to realize these objectives including
that notices of intended or planned procurement are published, minimum time periods for
bids, economic and technical requirements, terms of payment, etc.
Very few developing countries have joined the GPA, reflecting concerns that thwe GPA
impedes the ability to pursue industrial policy objectives and that national firms only have
limited ability to contest foreign procurement markets. These two factors significantly
reduce the incentive to engage in reciprocal negotiations to open procurement markets.
The lack of interest by many countries to join the GPA has led incumbent members to
pursue efforts aimed at extending procurement disciplines through the negotiation of PTAs.
Developing economies may be more willing to sign a PTA that includes procurement
liberalization given that concessions may be offered in other areas. This is not possible in
the GPA context given that the GPA deals only with public procurement.
6GPA membership spans Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong
Kong, China, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Rep., Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxemburg, Malta, Moldova, Rep., Montenegro, Netherlands, Netherlands for Aruba, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, USA.
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Several efforts have been made to classify the scope and coverage of procurement in
PTAs.7 What follows briefly describes a recent effort by Shingal, Ereshchenko and Mattoo
(2018) to assess the coverage of procurement provisions in PTAs. Of a total of 242 PTAs
currently in force that include at least one non-GPA signatory, 127 (52 percent) include
language on public procurement (Annex Table A1 lists the PTAs in the dataset and
indicates which PTAs include provisions on procurement). Of these 127 PTAs, 64 (50
percent) specify in some detail what types of procurement are covered (Table 1). Most
PP-PTAs are modelled to a greater or lesser extent on the GPA (Anderson et al. 2011).
Few go beyond the GPA in terms of rules or coverage although some do. Thus, a little
less than one-sixth include threshold values that are lower than those applying in the
GPA, implying that applicable rules of the PTA apply to a larger share of calls for tender
(Shingal et al. 2018).
Table 2.1: Depth of procurement commitments in PTAs with at least one non-GPA
signatory
Criterion Frequency (%)
Government procurement coverage is detailed in the agreement 49.6
The agreement covers only central government entities 8.5
Threshold values for purchases of goods are lower than in the GPA 14.7
Procurement provisions are enforceable (incl. via domestic review) 37.2
Note: Sample comprises 127 PTAs. See Annex Table A2.
Source: Shingal et al. (2018).
Of particular importance from the perspective of credibility of commitments is whether
provisions are enforceable. A total of 48 of the 127 PTAs have a hard law dimension in the
sense that at least some provisions can be invoked in formal dispute settlement procedures
and through domestic review (’bid challenge’) mechanisms that permit firms to contest
ongoing procurement tenders and awards. These types of requirements are also a key
feature of the GPA.8 Provisions calling for tenders be published, that bids are opened
in public, that procuring entities must award contracts to the lowest bid that satisfies
the technical criteria, and so forth, are much less relevant to firms if there is no effective
7Examples include Anderson et al. (2011) and Ueno (2013), who conclude that non-GPA countries
accept a level of procurement market access commitments in PTAs that are very similar to those that are
contained in the GPA.
8Most of the PP-PTAs that include binding (i.e., enforceable) procurement provisions include one or
more OECD member countries (see Annex Table A2). But there are also South-South PTAs involving
Central American states, Chile, Colombia and Peru. In addition to PTAs with other OECD member
countries, Chile, for example, has PP-PTAs with Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El
Salvador. There are no PTAs with serious coverage of procurement in Africa, the Middle East, or South
Asia.
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recourse if entities do not follow the rules. Domestic review mechanisms are in practice the
primary if not sole enforcement mechanism for firms, as State-to-State dispute resolution
is slow and does not offer a prospect of meaningful remedies, as these are prospective in
nature. Domestic review generally provides the possibility of compensation for tendering
costs, damages and legal fees.9
2.2.3 Related literature
Evenett and Shingal (2006) and Shingal (2015) have used data reported by the few
countries that provide statistics to the WTO on the national breakdown of winning
tenders on contracts that are covered by the GPA, focusing on Japan and Switzerland.
Evenett and Shingal (2006) conclude that a smaller share of contracts above the value
thresholds established by Japan was awarded to foreign suppliers in 1998-99 upon signing
the GPA than in 1990-91, prior to joining. Shingal (2015) analyzes the determinants of
procurement sourcing over time in these two countries, controlling for factors that may
affect sourcing from foreign firms such as the state of the business cycle and overall trade
policy trends and trade costs. He finds that GPA membership has no independent effect
on sourcing behavior. The same conclusion emerges from an analysis of the extension
of the GPA in 1996 to include services procurement. Again using data reported to the
WTO by Japan and Switzerland, Shingal (2011) finds that the share of services contracts
awarded to foreign suppliers declined over time for both countries. Similarly, Rickard and
Kono (2014), focusing on overall import penetration, conclude that GPA membership has
no impact on the ratio of imports to government demand.
In contrast, Chen and Whalley (2011) find that the GPA has a positive impact on trade
both among members and with third parties. However, they rely on self-reported public
procurement trade notifications to the GPA committee which are of low quality for most
countries. Tas, Dawar, Holmes and Togan (2018) focus on EU procurement. Using very
detailed transaction-level data on procurement awards from the EU Tenders Electronic
Database, they assess the effects of the GPA on procurement market openness of EU
countries. They conclude that the GPA increases the probability of a contract being
awarded to a foreign firm. They also find that the GPA reduces the risk of corruption by
decreasing the number of contests with single bidders and the number of wins by a single
firm. Identifying the independent effect of the GPA in the context of the EU is difficult
given that EU procurement law and policy is both broader and deeper than the GPA.
There is even less empirical research on PTAs than there is on the GPA. Rickard and Kono
(2014) assess the effects of 43 PTAs that include procurement, focusing on overall import
9Domestic review mechanisms take various forms. See World Bank (2016) for an overview of national
public procurement regimes.
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penetration and find that they have no impact on the ratio of imports to government
demand. Using data from the US Federal Procurement Data System set for 1996–2010,
Fronk (2015) finds a statistically significant positive effect of US agreements including
procurement. Using a gravity regression framework and focusing on agreements negotiated
by the US (including the GPA) that require national treatment of foreign bidders, Fronk
(2015) finds that these result in a 150 percent rise in the number of contracts won annually
by foreign bidders for tenders that exceed the value threshold of the relevant agreement.
However, this is only equivalent to an additional 135 contracts – reflecting the fact that
the overwhelming majority of contracts (some 98 percent) is awarded to US firms. Thus,
there is an effect, but because the baseline level of foreign awards is small, the magnitude
of the impact is also quite small. Because US data on nationality of winning bidders only
starts in the mid-1990s, this analysis cannot consider the fact that the countries that
mostly win procurement bids in the US (Canada, EU, Japan) have been members of the
GPA from the start (1981) and thus that much of the procurement that is analyzed was
already subject to disciplines for a long period of time. It is therefore not necessarily the
case that the positive sourcing effect attributed to the agreements is in fact due to them
as opposed to other factors.
Gourdon and Messent (2017) combine annual bilateral import data from UN Comtrade
covering 74 countries, 44 of which had signed PTAs with procurement provisions with at
least one other country in their sample, and the EU Tenders Electronic Daily database
for the period between 2009 and 2014 to analyze the determinants of EU procurement
sourcing. They find that the GPA increases the probability that foreign firms from a
GPA member win contracts in the EU. Gourdon and Messent (2017) also document that
restrictive FDI policies may undercut the impact of the GPA in expanding foreign sourcing.
They conclude that the GPA has an effect in reducing home bias in procurement awards.
A small number of papers use international input-output data of the type we use in
our analysis. Aguiar et al. (2016) and Kutlina-Dimitrova (2017) work with GTAP 9
data on public procurement and calculate counter-factual scenarios that remove observed
government home bias, finding large effects on GDP and economic welfare. Crespi and
Guarascio (2017) use WIOD to calculate public procurement openness, following the
definition of Messerlin and Miroudot (2012). They are concerned with measuring the
effect of procurement internationalization on domestic innovative activity. Mulabdic and
Rotunno (2017) similarly rely on the Messerlin and Miroudot (2012) methodology and
use OECD TiVA data to estimate bilateral gravity models of private versus government
sector openness. Their data comprise 5 year intervals between 1995 and 2009. They find
that EU membership has strong positive effects on public procurement openness. PTAs
do so as well but to a smaller extent, while the GPA has no effect on public procurement
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openness.
2.3 Openness of public procurement markets, the
GPA and PTAs: Descriptive evidence
The extant empirical studies of the effects of the GPA and PTAs in reducing home bias in
the award of procurement contracts come to ambiguous conclusions. Studies using detailed
micro data tend to be country or EU-specific. Despite its large share of GDP, comparable
disaggregated data on public procurement contracts and their allocation between national
and foreign bidders (suppliers) is not available on a cross-country basis.10
For our analysis of the impact of GPA membership and other PTAs on public sector
openness during the 2008 financial crisis we make use of data from WIOD. To the best
of our knowledge, our study is the first to estimate the effect of the GPA on trade using
government imports of value added. WIOD is one of a number of initiatives that have
emerged integrating and linking national IO tables across countries to provide data on
international economic linkages at the industry level. One advantage of using international
IO tables for analyzing public sector imports is that imports are defined consistently
across countries. The 2016 release of WIOD covers 43 countries from 2000 to 2014 and
includes the majority of GPA member countries as well as the major emerging economies
that are not GPA members.11 The set of countries included cover 85-90 percent of world
GDP over the sample period (Table 2). In earlier years GPA members make up most of
the sample GDP. This share falls to 68 percent in 2014, due to strong economic growth of
emerging economies that are not GPA members.
WIOD data on the country-industry decomposed share of imported products in total
government consumption are constructed on the basis of overall imports of different types
of goods as reflected in UN Comtrade statistics. Thus, they do not reflect actual reported
imports by governments as such data are not collected in national accounts statistics. In
the absence of detailed comparable data on actual procurement, WIOD offers a consistent
10Some countries report detailed contract level data on public procurement awards, e.g., the European
Union, Peru, Brazil, South Korea, Turkey and the US. With the exception of the EU and US, these
countries are not GPA members. Papers using these data to assess the determinants and economic effects
of contract awards include Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos (2016), Hebous and Zimmerman (2016), Ferraz
et al. (2015) and Lee (2017). For example, Onur, Ozcan and Tas (2012) analyze 90,000 government
procurement tenders held in Turkey during the 2004–06 period. They find that the number of bidders
significantly and negatively impacts on the prices paid and that opening tenders to foreign participation
further lowers prices paid.
11Details on the construction of WIOD can be found in Timmer et al. (2015). We chose WIOD over
the OECD ICIO database as the latter only has data through 2011.
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Table 2.2: Share of included countries in global GDP
Share of Sample in World Output Share of GPA in Sample Output
year Gross output Value added Gross output Value added
2000 0.14 0.86 0.09 0.91
2001 0.14 0.86 0.09 0.91
2002 0.14 0.86 0.09 0.91
2003 0.14 0.86 0.09 0.91
2004 0.15 0.85 0.09 0.91
2005 0.17 0.83 0.10 0.90
2006 0.18 0.82 0.11 0.89
2007 0.21 0.79 0.12 0.88
2008 0.23 0.77 0.13 0.87
2009 0.24 0.76 0.12 0.88
2010 0.27 0.73 0.13 0.87
2011 0.29 0.71 0.14 0.86
2012 0.30 0.70 0.15 0.85
2013 0.32 0.68 0.15 0.85
2014 0.32 0.68 0.14 0.86
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD 2016 database.
and comparable set of proxies for government imports. Even though the specific figure for
the share of government consumption in total national imports is unlikely to accurately
reflect actual procurement patterns in the country concerned, because the WIOD data
are constructed on a consistent basis in the same way for all countries, they nonetheless
permit an assessment of differences across countries in government imports at a point in
time as well as trends over time.
To motivate the subsequent empirical analysis, Figure 1 plots the average PIP for GPA
member and non-member countries over time. Two patterns stand out: First, in the
pre-2008 period, public import shares of GPA members and non-members follow similar
trends. For both groups, public import shares are rising. Second, PIP evolves differently
between the two groups following the 2008 financial crisis. While initially PIP experiences
a substantial drop in 2009 for both groups, it recovers for GPA member countries and
remains high through the end of the sample period (2014). For non-GPA member countries
on the other hand, the drop in PIP is bigger, the immediate rebound of the import share
is less pronounced and the average public import share declines after 2010, reversing
the pre-crisis positive trend. Furthermore, while non-member–s average PIP was higher
pre-crisis than for GPA members this pattern is reversed after 2008.
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Figure 2.1: Public Import Penetration by GPA membership over time
Table 3 provides more texture, reporting PIP ratios for selected countries for three
time periods, 2000-02, 2007-09 and 2012-14. The countries selected are large, given a
presumption that small countries will generally display higher PIPs as they have fewer
opportunities to source nationally from globally efficient firms. The data indicate that
the PIP ratios for the EU28 are some 10 percent higher than those of the US,12 and both
import less than the simple world average (7 percent) which is to be expected given that
large economies will be better able to source domestically.
The non-GPA members included in Table 3 source more from abroad than the GPA
members during the first two periods: 6.2 vs. 5.7 in the 2000-02 period. This changes
over the course of the decade: In 2007-09 the PIP ratios for the two groups are roughly
the same, and by 2012-14 the GPA countries have higher PIP ratios than the selected
non-GPA members (6.5 percent vs. 5.6 percent). However, the selected countries in both
groups source less from the rest of the world than the world average - presumably reflecting
their above average size. There are large differences across countries, with Brazil only
sourcing 2.9 percent from abroad, as compared to Korea at 11.6 percent in 2012-14. Some
of the larger non-GPA countries appear to have been shifting steadily away from foreign
sourcing since 2000. This is the case for India, Turkey and China (post-2008). On average,
GPA members see a more rapid increase in foreign sourcing during the 2000-14 period,
resulting in convergence over time towards the average level of ’openness’ of the world as
a whole, confirming the unweighted results from Figure 1.
12Extra-EU in Table 3 measures the import content from non-EU countries, i.e., it excludes intra-EU
sourcing by the public sector.
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Table 2.3: Government consumption (import penetration ratios, selected countries)
avg. avg. avg. % ∆ % ∆
2000-02 2007-09 2012-14 2000-08 2008-14
Non-GPA-members:
Australia 6.1 5.9 5.5 -4.2 -6.7
Brazil 2.2 2.5 2.9 11.7 18.9
China 3.7 4.8 4.0 31.7 -17.0
India 4.0 5.5 5.5 35.1 -0.1
Indonesia 10.2 7.0 6.4 -31.5 -7.8
Mexico 5.8 6.1 6.6 4.5 8.3
Turkey 11.2 8.1 6.2 -27.7 -23.8
Average 6.2 5.7 5.3 -8.0 -6.8
GPA members:
Canada 4.7 5.2 5.1 10.6 -1.8
Extra-EU 3.7 4.6 4.8 23.8 6.2
Japan 2.2 4.4 6.6 103.8 50.8
Korea 8.7 9.6 11.6 11.3 20.2
US 3.3 4.1 4.1 26.4 -1.2
Average 4.5 5.6 6.5 24.3 15.4
World 5.7 7.0 7.0 21.9 0.8
Memo: Intra-EU 3.8 4.6 4.8 22.0 2.7
Note: Averages are simple country averages.
Source: WIOD 2016 database.
Table 4 reports the results of a simple OLS regression of PIP by country across time,
distinguishing between GPA members and non-GPA members, as follows:
PIPt = β0 + β1GPA+ β2Trend+ β3GPA× Trend+ ut
where PIP is defined as imports of value added in government consumption final demand,
GPA is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is a GPA member and Trend is a linear
annual trend variable equal to 1 in the base year 2000.13 This model is estimated using
data on all countries included in WIOD (43 countries plus a residual –rest of the world–
variable). GPA members show a larger share of foreign sourcing over the period covered
when conditioning on GPA membership exclusively (column 1), but this is something
that occurred for all countries over the time period (column 2). Column 3 reports the
results including the interaction effect between GPA membership and the time trend.
While non-GPA members show no signs of growth in PIP over the sample period, GPA
13The construction of PIP is discussed in greater detail in the next section.
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members exhibit a significantly positive trend in PIP between 2000 and 2014. We take
these simple regression results as suggestive that GPA membership may play a role in
sustaining public sector openness.
Table 2.4: PIP trends over time by GPA membership
(1) (2) (3)






Constant 0.0606*** 0.0854*** 0.0681***
(0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0062)
Observations 660 660 660
Note: ∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
Figure 2 plots the evolution of procurement coverage of PTAs over time, which we use as
an additional explanatory variable in the empirical analysis. The underlying data span
all agreements included in Shingal, Ereshchenko and Mattoo (2018) that have at least
one participating country from the WIOD sample. Figure 2 plots the trend in the simple
annual average number of three categories of PTAs (any PTA, those including text on
public procurement, and those that have enforceable provisions), differentiating between
GPA members and non-GPA members. Two features are worth noting. First, the growth in
the number of PTAs since the 2000s is primarily driven by GPA member countries. Up to
the early 2000s, the overall number of agreements is similar for member and non-member
countries. Since then it has grown substantially for GPA member countries, while the
increase has been much more modest for non-GPA members.14 Second, the increase in
the number of PTAs is driven by an increase in PTAs that include public procurement
provisions. While the number of PTAs with enforceable procurement provisions has been
growing more slowly, it has accelerated during the last decade.
14The pronounced jump from 2003 to 2004 is driven by the 2004 EU enlargement.
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of Public Procurement Provisions in PTAs
2.4 Empirical analysis
Both the trends in aggregate PIP for the countries included in Figure 1 and the post-crisis
differentials in openness suggested by Table 3 suggest that GPA membership may have
played a role in sustaining public sector openness following the 2008 financial crisis. In
this Section we use the panel structure of our data to investigate the impact of GPA
membership empirically. While this does not permit a causal interpretation, the aim is to
assess whether GPA membership is associated with patterns of foreign sourcing during and
after the 2008 financial crisis and how GPA membership interacts with alternative sources
of international procurement discipline, i.e., PP-PTAs. We also explore the robustness of
the results to inclusion of a variety of alternative determinants of PIP, including country
size, level of development and the general level of restrictiveness of trade and investment
policies.
We regress PIP by country over the 2000-14 period on GPA membership status, the
number of PTAs and the type of PTA, distinguishing between PTAs that have pro-
curement provisions and those that are enforceable. We use a fixed effects methodology,
employing country-level fixed effects. This precludes direct estimation of the effects of
GPA membership on PIP, as it is collinear with the fixed effects because GPA membership
is a variable that is constant during the time period considered for practically all countries
in the sample. However, the approach does allow for assessment of the effect of GPA
membership in the post crisis period by including an interaction effect between GPA
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membership status and the crisis. This is our variable of interest.
The model we estimate is:
PIPit = β1Crisist + β2GPAi + β3Crisist ×GPAi + βCControlsit + αi + uit. (2.1)
PIP is defined as imports of value added in the government consumption final demand
category of WIOD. Following Koopman et al. (2014) country-industry value added
contained in government final consumption demand V A(FDgov) is computed as
V A(FDgov) = V̂ ·B · FDgov
where B = (I−A)−1 is the country-industry Leontief inverse, FDgov is a country-industry
× country matrix including country-industry dollar flows into the government final
consumption demand of the respective country and V̂ is a country-industry diagonal
matrix with country-industry domestic value added shares on the main diagonal. Value
added import shares are then obtained by summing country-industry value added imports
and dividing by total value added absorbed by government final consumption demand.
Crisis is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all years from 2008 onwards. GPA is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for GPA members. Controls include trade and FDI policies,
country size and level of development. Avg.Tariff is the weighted average tariff rate
imposed on merchandise imports for a respective country and year. It is obtained from
the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).15 FDIRI is an index of the degree of
restrictiveness of policies towards FDI compiled by the OECD and described in Kalinova
et al. (2010).16 This is available for 1997, 2003, 2006 and on an annual basis for the
post 2010 period. It is interpolated linearly for years in which the index is not reported.
No.PTAs; No.PTAsw/PP ; and No.PTAsw/ enforceable PP measure the number of
PTAs a given country is a member of in the respective year, those that have public
procurement provisions (PP); and those with PP that are binding i.e., can be enforced.
These three variables are obtained from Shingal et al. (2018). All PTAs that include at
least one country in our WIOD sample are counted. Enforceability refers to the PTA
requiring domestic review mechanisms and permitting parties to invoke dispute settlement
procedures on procurement matters. GDP and GDP per capita is measured in 2010 US$
and is sourced from the World Bank Development Indicators database.
We do not include time fixed effects as this renders the Crisis indicator collinear. This is
problematic in our context, since the Crisis indicator measures the baseline impact of
the crisis for GPA non-members, against which we want to compare the Crisis×GPA
15Available at http://wits.worldbank.org.
16FDIRRI data are available at https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=FDIINDEX#.
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interaction. Moreover, including time fixed effects absorbs changes in the PTA controls,
since accession to a PTA is associated with a one-time jump in the associated variable. As
we are interested in the relationship between PTAs and GPA membership, their number
and changes therein are a key control variable.17 We report two sets of regression results.
The first focuses on the interaction between GPA membership and the number and
characteristics of PTAs (Table 5). The second investigates the robustness of the results to
the inclusion of the controls mentioned above (Table 6).
Column 1 in Table 5 reports results without any PTA controls. The crisis interaction
with GPA membership is strongly statistically significant and positive, implying that
GPA members have a higher PIP in the post crisis years compared to non-GPA countries.
Columns 2 - 4 explore the effect of controlling for the number of PTAs per country,
the number of PP-PTAs and the number of PP-PTAs with enforceable procurement
provisions, respectively. Column 2 estimates the effect of an additional PTA, regardless of
whether it includes PP provisions of any kind or not. Column 3 estimates the effect of an
additional PTA with PP provisions, deep or shallow, and Column 4 estimates the effect
of an additional PTA with deep (that is, enforceable) PP provisions on PIP.
The estimated coefficient increases in moving from Column 2 through Column 4, indicating
that the number and depth of PP provisions in PTAs is indeed associated with higher
government sector import shares. The significance level and magnitude of the estimated
GPA∗Crisis interaction coefficient declines slightly but remains sizable and highly signif-
icant throughout.18 Controlling for the overall number of PTAs and the inclusion of public
procurement provisions (models (2) and (3)), yields marginally significant effects. However,
once we control exclusively for PTAs that have binding public procurement disciplines
(column (4)), the estimated coefficient increases substantially, both quantitatively and in
statistical significance.
To sum up the results from Table 5, the GPA ∗ Crisis interaction effect is robust to the
inclusion of alternative sources of international public procurement discipline (PTAs), and
is almost constant quantitatively. This seems to be the case primarily for PP-PTAs that
are enforceable and thus constitute more credible commitments to sustaining public sector
openness. These results indicate that both GPA and PTAs are associated with high PIP
17If we estimate the model including time fixed effects we nonetheless obtain Crisis*GPA interaction
coefficients comparable in size and significance to our main specification. Results are available on request.
18All results presented are based on the model presented in Equation (??). However, as noted previously,
the GPA membership indicator GPAi is dropped throughout due to collinearity problems. For our sample
period, GPA membership is constant for almost all countries in the sample, with exception of the countries
accessing the EU during this period. This implies that GPA membership is not identified separately from
the country fixed effect αi.
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Table 2.5: GPA and PTA Provisions
Dependent variable: Public Consumption Value Added Import Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis −0.5585 −0.7307 −0.6545 −0.6054
(0.3801) (0.4082) (0.3917) (0.3771)
No. PTA 0.0465∗
(0.0196)
No. PTA w/ PP 0.0638∗
(0.0295)
No. PTA, enforc. PP 0.1777∗∗∗
(0.0475)
Crisis*GPA 1.6694∗∗∗ 1.3886∗∗ 1.3660∗∗ 1.3437∗∗
(0.4515) (0.4747) (0.4663) (0.4398)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 660 660 660 660
R2 0.1582 0.1766 0.1731 0.1720
Adjusted R2 0.0965 0.1148 0.1111 0.1098
Note: ∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
and their effects potentially interact.
Table 6 reports results with controls for additional explanatory variables. Column 2
includes the OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index (FDIRI) and the weighted average applied
tariff on merchandise imports. These are included to control for general policies towards
openness. As public procurement projects are often complex and regulation-intensive
establishing a foreign affiliate is a common way to compete for contracts. To control for
barriers to this indirect form of imports, we therefore include the FDIRI in addition to tariff
rates on direct imports. Larger and more developed countries generally feature different
levels of openness. GPA member countries are on average richer than non-members in
the WIOD sample, which could potentially drive our results. A second set of controls in
Column 3 controls for country size and development, proxied by real GDP and real GDP
per capita.
The coefficient on direct tariff barriers is negative but insignificant throughout. This
is what we would expect, since the public sector effectively does not pay tariffs. The
GPA*Crisis interaction slightly decreases in size, but continues to be highly significant.
A similar picture arises for GDP per capita. While the effect is quantitatively small, it
also carries the expected, positive sign. When including all the controls and number of
PTAs, the interaction coefficient of interest declines slightly in both size and significance
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Table 2.6: GPA membership: additional controls
Dependent variable: Public Consumption Value Added Import Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crisis −0.5585 −0.6887 −1.1117∗ −0.7801 −0.8944
(0.3801) (0.5211) (0.4570) (0.5395) (0.5412)
FDIRI 2.9005 4.1451 6.1542
(4.1216) (4.4874) (4.1917)






No. PTAs 0.0616∗∗ 0.0380
(0.0195) (0.0209)
Crisis*GPA 1.6694∗∗∗ 1.8070∗∗∗ 1.8708∗∗∗ 1.3939∗∗ 1.5031∗∗
(0.4515) (0.5044) (0.4995) (0.5356) (0.5338)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 660 538 630 538 538
R2 0.1582 0.1866 0.1958 0.2098 0.2327
Adjusted R2 0.0965 0.1194 0.1339 0.1427 0.1643
Note: ∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
but remains overall robust. We interpret this as an additional support for the hypothesis
that international procurement disciplines matter and interact.
Overall, the results from the panel regression suggest that GPA membership during the
crisis is associated with a higher public sector openness compared to non-member countries.
This conclusion is robust to general measures of trade protectionism and country size and
development. GPA membership continues to be significant also when including alternative
measures of international procurement discipline such as the number and characteristics
of PTAs. The reduced coefficient size and significance level suggest that the GPA and
PP-PTAs are partial substitutes in sustaining public sector openness.
2.4.1 Placebo regression results
The results presented in the preceding sections are indicative of GPA membership playing
a role in sustaining public sector openness following the 2008 crisis. However, the nature
63
of our question and data prevents us from relying on controlled and exogenous variation
in order to draw robust causal inference. To corroborate our results, we conduct a placebo
regression exercise. This involves a replication of our main specification with an alternative
outcome variable that is expected on theoretical grounds not be affected by our main
explanatory variable, GPA membership. If the nature of our mechanism is causal, GPA
membership should not affect the alternative outcome variable. In our case, a promising
candidate as placebo outcome variable arises naturally from the fact that the GPA covers
public sector imports exclusively. Accordingly, private sector imports do not fall under
the GPA by definition and should be unaffected by GPA membership.
One possibility invalidating private consumption imports as placebo outcome is if there is
a potential interaction between the crisis and GPA membership. As discussed previously,
the GPA member countries are on average richer than non-member countries. As the
crisis originated in the U.S and the EU, it may have affected developed economies in a
systematically different way than emerging economies. This would invalidate our choice
of private consumption imports as placebo outcome, insofar as GPA membership would
mask the differential impact of the crisis because of the characteristics of the underlying
economies.
To shed light on this, Figures 3 and 4 plot average GDP growth rates and private
consumption import growth rates for GPA member and non-member countries, weighted
by GDP. While the GDP growth rates differ between GPA members and non-members
as expected, both show a comparable decline during the crisis. Similarly, average private
consumption import shares seem similarly affected by the crisis. We view this as supporting
the validity of our choice of private consumption import share as placebo outcome variable.
Results from the placebo regression are reported in Tables 7 and 8. Column 1 replicates
the regression on the crisis and GPA interaction effect. Not controlling for other covariates,
the measured impact of GPA membership is statistically significant and sizable for private
consumption import shares. However, this changes once we take into account the number
of PTAs in Columns 2 to 4, suggesting the GPA-crisis variable is picking up the effects
of trade policy disciplines more generally. Since PTAs by definition seek to improve
access to markets and reduce policy uncertainty for the private sector, the positive and
significant coefficient is what we would expect. The magnitude of the estimate increases
as the relevant PTAs become deeper, which is consistent with deeper PTAs providing
greater security of market access conditions. In the final model that includes only the
subset of PP-PTAs with enforceable procurement provisions (column 4) the crisis-GDP
interaction effect becomes marginally significant again. This is not inconsistent with our
hypothesis, as in this regression we omit other PTAs which target overall (private) imports.
Given that PTAs with enforceable PP provisions also feature more extensive coverage and
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commitments in a variety of other policy areas that are salient for the private sector, this




Table 8 reports results for the replication of the regression including additional controls.
The covariate coefficients generally behave as expected. Coefficients of trade restrictions,
both for direct imports and for foreign investment are negative and significant. GDP per
capita is positively associated with private consumption imports and larger countries
tend to import less, although this effect is only marginally significant. Controlling for per-
capita income, which is correlated with GPA membership status, the Crisis×GPA effect
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weakens and once the number of PTAs is controlled for, the effect becomes completely
insignificant, as we would expect.
Table 2.7: GPA and PTA Provisions
Dependent variable: Private Consumption Value Added Import Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis 0.2654 −0.4711 −0.1846 0.1362
(0.4042) (0.4485) (0.3681) (0.4036)
No. PTA 0.1990∗∗∗
(0.0441)
No. PTA w/ PP 0.2988∗∗∗
(0.0665)
No. PTA, enforc. PP 0.4896∗∗∗
(0.1434)
Crisis*GPA 2.1030∗∗∗ 0.9019 0.6811 1.2056∗
(0.5547) (0.5628) (0.5418) (0.5556)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 660 660 660 660
R2 0.2440 0.3652 0.3619 0.2817
Adjusted R2 0.1886 0.3176 0.3141 0.2278
Note: ∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Overall, we take the results from the placebo exercise as additional confirmation for the
hypothesis that the GPA, an agreement that entails binding, enforceable commitments to
procure goods on a nondiscriminatory basis, served to back-stop public sector openness in
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.
Finally, Annex Table A-3 presents the results from a Mundlak (1978) correction regression
that includes country-averages of all time-varying control variables in the estimation of a
random effects model. The means of GDP, GDP per Capita and average tariffs are all
significant, while the means of FDIRI and No. of PTAs are not. The latter two variables
are less time-varying than the former three, which might explain this pattern. We take
the results as supporting the use of fixed effects in the main specifications.
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Table 2.8: Placebo GPA and additional controls
Dependent variable: Private Consumption Value Added Import Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crisis 0.2654 −0.6859 −0.4129 −1.0055 −0.9543
(0.4042) (0.6359) (0.6174) (0.6985) (0.6731)
FDIRI −8.3104∗∗ −3.9564 0.2764
(3.0903) (4.4056) (3.6503)






No. PTAs 0.2157∗∗∗ 0.1532∗∗
(0.0475) (0.0509)
Crisis*GPA 2.1030∗∗∗ 2.6484∗∗∗ 1.7190∗ 1.2033 1.1455
(0.5547) (0.6975) (0.6869) (0.8556) (0.8091)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 660 538 630 538 538
R2 0.2440 0.2997 0.3917 0.4129 0.4783
Adjusted R2 0.1886 0.2418 0.3448 0.3631 0.4317
Note: ∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2.5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigate the association between commitments in trade agreements not
to discriminate in the award of public procurement contracts and public sector openness
following the 2008 financial crisis. We view our findings as a first attempt to explore the
role of trade agreements as devices to discipline public procurement policies. To date,
arguments regarding the role of the GPA and PTAs that include procurement provisions
have mostly been conceptual and normative in nature. There has been very little empirical
research on the relative contribution of the GPA and PTAs as commitment mechanisms or
on their interaction. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first effort to analyze
empirically the possible commitment role of the GPA using a cross-country panel dataset.
Our analysis complements previous empirical work on this subject, which has tended
to focus on whether the GPA or PTAs result in greater foreign sourcing. The empirical
literature on the effect of the trade agreements finds only weak or no evidence that they are
associated with a subsequent increase in the share of government procurement allocated
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to foreign firms/products.19 The data we use in this paper suggest that whatever the
market access-increasing effects of the GPA and PTAs with enforceable public procurement
provisions (that is, taking as given the level of PIP at a point in time) the GPA may serve
to constrain backsliding into protectionism when economic times are bad, and that the
GPA and PP-PTAs function as partial substitutes in sustaining public sector openness.
The potential role of trade agreements as a commitment device is particularly important for
public procurement. As documented by Shingal (2015), home bias increases in recessions.
Evenett and Shingal (2016) note that many governments sought to allocate greater funding
after 2008 to domestic firms through the procurement process. The post-crisis period
therefore provides further evidence confirming previous research that governments have
incentives (confront significant pressures) to increase home bias in recessions. This is
reflected in the decrease in openness of procurement observed in non-GPA members after
2008. The fact that trends in PIP for GPA and non-GPA member countries were similar
before the crisis (towards increased openness) is important in this regard. The divergence
in PIP trends after 2008 suggests that commitments by governments not to discriminate
against trading partners may have played a role in constraining a greater procurement
protectionism. The finding that this relationship is observed most strongly for agreements
that are binding and enforceable supports this interpretation.
That the GPA may have served as a device that helped to prevent back-sliding in the
post-crisis period is corroborated both by our main regression results controlling for public
procurement provisions in bilateral PTAs and by the placebo regression exercise. While
the cross-country panel regression analysis does not permit strict causal interpretation,
the placebo regression results provide additional support for the robustness of the results.
We do not observe that the GPA has a similar association with (changes in) private sector
consumption import shares. These are by definition exogenous to GPA provisions, which
only cover the public sector. For the private sector PTAs should matter of course, as PTAs
as such should promote trade. Once this general role of PTAs is controlled for, there is no
relationship between GPA*Crisis and private consumption import shares. Whether the
patterns observed in the data will continue to be observed in the future is an open question.
Data spanning a longer period of time after 2008 will provide additional evidence.
19Examples include Evenett and Shingal (2006), Shingal (2011; 2015), Rickard and Kono (2013) and
Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos (2016).
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Table A-1: PTAs with and without public procurement provisions
w/o procurement provisions w/ procurement provisions
APTA Australia-Chile
APTA-Accession of China Australia-China
ASEAN - India Australia-NZ
ASEAN - Japan Brunei-Darussalam-Japan
ASEAN FTA CAFTA-DR
ASEAN- Australia/New Zealand CEFTA
ASEAN-Korea Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)





Central American Common Market Canada-Peru
CARICOM Chile - China
CEMAC Chile - Costa Rica
Common Economic Zone (UKR, BLR, KAZ, RUS) Chile-Colombia
COMESA Chile-El Salvador
Canada-Jordan Chile-Guatemala
Chile - India Chile-Honduras




China – New Zealand Colombia-Northern Triangle
China-Hong Kong Costa Rica - Singapore
China-Macau Costa Rica-Colombia
Colombia-Mexico Costa Rica-Peru
Costa Rica-China Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)
East African Community (EAC) EFTA - Albania
EAC-Burundi/Rwanda EFTA - Jordan
Eurasian Economic Community EFTA - Lebanon
EAEU-Armenia EFTA - SACU
EAEU-Kyrgyzstan EFTA - Serbia
Economic Cooperation Organization FTA EFTA - Tunisia
ECOWAS EFTA -Morocco
EU - Albania EFTA-Bosnia and Herzegovina
EU - Cote d’Ivoire EFTA-Central America
EU - Lebanon EFTA-Chile
EU - San Marino EFTA-Colombia
EU-Andorra EFTA-Macedonia
EU-FYR Macedonia EFTA-Mexico
EU-Faroe islands EFTA-Palestinian Authority
EU-NZ-Malaysia EFTA-Peru
EU-Papua New Guinea-Fiji EFTA-Turkey
EU-Syria EU - Algeria
El Salvador Honduras EU - Bosnia and Herzegovina
El Salvador-Cuba EU - Cameroon
Gulf Cooperation Council EU - Central America
Global System of Trade Preferences Agreement EU - Jordan
Georgia - Armenia EU - Montenegro
Georgia - Kazakhstan EU - Serbia





Guatemala- Chinese Taipei EU-CARIFORUM
India - Afghanistan EU-Chile
India – Bhutan EU-Colombia and Peru
India – Malaysia EU-Eastern and Southern Africa
India – Nepal EU-Mexico
India – Singapore EU-Palestinian authority
India - Sri Lanka EU-South Africa
Japan - Indonesia EU-Turkey
Japan- Malaysia Egypt – EFTA
Korea-India Egypt – Turkey
Korea-Turkey Faroe Island - Norway
Korea-Vietnam Faroe Islands-Switzerland
Kyrgyz Republic - Armenia GCC-Singapore
Kyrgyz Republic Uzbekistan HK China-Chile
Kyrgyz Republic-Kazakhstan Iceland - Faroe Islands
Kyrgyz Republic-Ukraine Iceland-China
Kyrgyz republic-Moldova India- Japan
LAIA-ALADI Israeli-Mexico
Lao-Thailand Japan - Australia
MERCOSUR Japan - Philippines
MERCOSUR - India Japan - Thailand




Mexico-Peru Jordan – Singapore
Nicaragua-Chinese Taipei Korea-Australia
Pan-Arab FTA Korea-Chile
Papua New Guinea-Australia Korea-Colombia
Pakistan - Malaysia Korea-Singapore
Pakistan - Sri Lanka Melanesian Spearhead Group
Panama - Chinese Taipei Mexico-Central America
Panama-Chile NAFTA
Panama-DR Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement
Panama-Nicaragua Pacific Alliance











SAFTA Thailand - Australia
SAFTA-Afghanistan Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement Turkey – Bosnia/Herzegovina
South Pacific Regional Trade & Econ. Coop. Agreement Turkey - Jordan
Thailand-NZ Turkey - Montenegro
Turkey - Albania Turkey - Morocco
Turkey - Chile Turkey - Palestine
Turkey-Mauritius Turkey - Serbia
Ukraine - Azerbaijan Turkey - Syria
Ukraine - Belarus Turkey Israel
Ukraine - Kazakhstan Turkey- Georgia
Ukraine - Tajikistan Turkey-Macedonia
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Ukraine - Turkmenistan Turkey-Tunisia














Table A-2: Subset of PTAs including procurement language/provisions





Central European Free Trade Agreement Canada-Panama
CIS Canada-Peru
Canada - Costa Rica Chile - Costa Rica





Costa Rica-Colombia Costa Rica - Singapore
Costa Rica-Peru EAEU
EFTA - Albania EFTA-Central America
EFTA - Jordan EFTA-Chile
EFTA - Lebanon EFTA-Colombia
EFTA - SACU EFTA-Mexico
EFTA - Serbia EFTA-Peru
EFTA - Tunisia EU - Central America
EFTA -Morocco EU- Georgia
EFTA-Bosnia and Herzegovina EU-CARIFORUM
EFTA-Macedonia EU-Chile
EFTA-Palestinian Authority EU-Colombia and Peru
EFTA-Turkey Faroe Island - Norway
EU - Algeria Faroe Islands-Switzerland
EU - Bosnia and Herzegovina GCC-Singapore
EU - Cameroon HK China-Chile
EU - Jordan Israeli-Mexico
EU - Montenegro Japan - Australia









Egypt - EFTA Trans Pacific Economic Partnership
Egypt - Turkey US-Australia
Iceland - Faroe Islands US-Bahrain
Iceland-China US-Chile
India- Japan US-Colombia
Japan - Philippines US-Oman
Japan - Thailand US-Panama
Japan - Vietnam US-Peru
Japan-Mongolia Australia-Chile
Jordan - Singapore Canada-Chile
Korea-Singapore Canada-Colombia
Melanesian Spearhead Group Canada-Honduras
Mexico-Central America Canada-Panama
Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement Canada-Peru
Pacific Alliance Chile - Costa Rica






Panama-Peru Costa Rica - Singapore
Singapore-Australia Eurasian Economic Union
Thailand - Australia EFTA-Central America
Turkey – Bosnia/Herzegovina EFTA-Chile
Turkey - Jordan EFTA-Colombia
Turkey - Montenegro EFTA-Mexico
Turkey - Morocco EFTA-Peru
Turkey - Palestine EU - Central America
Turkey - Serbia EU- Georgia
Turkey - Syria EU-CARIFORUM
Turkey Israel EU-Chile
Turkey- Georgia EU-Colombia and Peru





Ukraine - FYR Macedonia Japan - Australia



















Table A-3: Mundlak correction regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GPA 2.9491 0.2323 4.0039∗∗ 0.1484 1.5034
(1.6268) (1.7397) (1.5296) (1.6401) (1.7796)
Crisis -0.5585 -0.6908 -1.1117∗ -0.7842 -0.8964
(0.3806) (0.5236) (0.4584) (0.5431) (0.5456)
GPA*Crisis 1.6694∗∗∗ 1.8130∗∗∗ 1.8708∗∗∗ 1.3929∗∗ 1.5017∗∗
(0.4522) (0.5068) (0.5011) (0.5391) (0.5380)
FDIRI 2.9076 4.1790 6.1776
(4.1334) (4.5108) (4.2213)






No. PTAs 0.0628∗∗ 0.0389
(0.0196) (0.0211)
Avg FDIRI -7.9432 -4.9917 -4.2315
(9.4620) (8.3390) (9.6724)
Avg Tariff -0.4946∗ -0.4664∗ -0.5451∗∗
(0.2230) (0.1942) (0.1889)
Avg GDP -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0010∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Avg GDP/Capita -0.0002∗∗ -0.0001∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Avg No. PTAs 0.1952 -0.0062
(0.2068) (0.1644)
Constant 9.5197∗∗∗ 13.4687∗∗∗ 10.2262∗∗∗ 10.1773∗∗∗ 13.2172∗∗∗
(1.4710) (2.0449) (1.3685) (3.0227) (2.5097)
Observations 660 538 630 538 538
Note: ∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Chapter 3





This paper presents novel empirical evidence that the level of detail and legal enforceability
of public procurement provisions in preferential trade agreements are associated with
a significantly higher volume of bilateral trade flows absorbed by public sector final
demand in the importing country. This result is primarily driven by developments in
the European Union. The existing literature on the relationship between international
public procurement commitments and public sector openness emphasizes the importance
on the enforceability of international provisions. Arguably, enforcement of EU public
procurement regulation is particulary pronounced. The findings presented in this paper
thus complement and confirm the existing literature on the topic.
3.1 Introduction
Public procurement is a large market. In most economies, it makes up more than 10% of
GDP (Worldbank 2017). Public administrations thus act not only as market regulators but
are themselves important economic actors. Incentives in the government sector however are
often different from those of private economic actors. One example is the strong tendency
of the state to prefer domestic firms over foreign firms when awarding public procurement
1I would like to thank Bernard Hoekman for numerous comments and suggestions.
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contracts.2 This preference materializes in import shares in the public procurement (PP)
sector that are substantially lower than in the general economy.
For a long time, public procurement has been sidelined in international trade negotiations.
The first version of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) enter into
force only 1981 and the number of PP provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
started to increase only recently (see Figure 3.1 below and Dengler and Hoekman (2018)
for further details). Reducing international discrimination in public procurement is the
stated aim of these provisions. Crucially though, the content of PP provisions varies
widely across different PTAs, in terms of scope and content as well as in terms of legal
enforceability (Shingal and Ereshchenko 2018). Among the most recent PTAs, more
and more include enforceable PP commitments with extensive coverage, not confined to
reciprocity of market access but also including details on regulatory questions and the
practical implementation of the provisions (B. M. Hoekman 2017).3
The emergence and proliferation of detailed PP provisions in PTAs raises the question
of whether these more substantive types of agreements have a real effects on bilateral
trade in a systematic way. In this paper I study to what extent the proliferation and
deepening of PP provisions in recent PTAs leads to tangible changes in the tradeflows they
cover, using a bilateral gravity framework. Previous research has not found real effects of
PP openness commitments and attributed this to a lack of legal enforceability (Rickard
and Kono 2014). In this paper I revisit this question using more direct measures of PP
imports and a novel classification of PTA PP provisions by Shingal and Ereshchenko
(2018), explicitly designed to distinguish PP provisions by their legal enforceability.
I find that the presence of deep PP provisions is indeed associated with significantly
higher trade volume absorbed by the government sector in the importing country. When
looking at government imports disaggregated by economic sector, it becomes clear that
this aggregate finding is driven primarily by service sector imports. Furthermore, the real
impact of PP provisions seems to be driven primarily by the European Union. The results
are not robust to excluding intra-EU bilateral flows.
There is a considerable literature on estimating the impact of trade policy on bilateral trade
flows using gravity-type specifications (see Head and Mayer (2014) for a recent survey).
2A particularly prominent example of this are the Buy American provisions in the United States. For
more systematic evidence, see Breton and Salmon (1996), Evenett and Hoekman (2005) and Shingal
(2015).
3B. M. Hoekman (2017) gives the example of the Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on
a Closer Economic Partnership, which aims to establish a “single New Zealand/Singapore government
procurement market” which is going beyond reciprocal access to e.g. establish mutual consistency of
national PP tender rules and specifications.
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These type of regressions are well suited to investigate potential effects of trade agreements
on bilateral trade flows, since for each bilateral flow it can be directly controlled if and by
which type of agreement it is governed. In this spirit, Dhingra, Freeman, and Mavroeidi
(2018) investigate the effect of deep vs shallow EIAs, exploiting recent information from
the DESTA database on the presence of different types of provisions in trade agreements.
Their paper focuses on the trade policy implications of Brexit for the UK. The underlying
trade flow data originates from the World Input Output Database (WIOD). This enables
the authors to investigate both gross versus value added trade flows and to split flows
by intermediate and final use in the importing country. However, Dhingra, Freeman, and
Mavroeidi (2018) do not attempt to split final demand further into private and government
final demand and do not investigate PTA provisions governing the government sector at
all.
Dengler and Hoekman (2018) investigate the effect of the GPA and PTA PPs on public
sector openness and find that PTA PPs, in particular their enforceability, have a significant
effect on average public consumption import shares following the 2008 financial crisis.
Dengler and Hoekman (2018) employ a country panel methodology, which does not
directly link bilateral trade flows to the potential presence of an agreement. The results
are therefore suggestive but raise the question of whether the measured effects are robust
to different methodologies.
This paper investigates the effect of public procurement provisions using bilateral gravity
regressions, exploiting the novel PTA public procurement clause classification by Shingal
and Ereshchenko (2018). Like Dhingra, Freeman, and Mavroeidi (2018), trade flow data is
adopted from WIOD. WIOD enables the calculation of value added trade flows, which
is particularly relevant as the indirect imports into the government sector are much
higher than direct imports (Ramboll and Chur (2011), Cernat and Kutlina-Dimitrova
(2016)). While country-industry import flows absorbed by government consumption
demand are partially imputed in WIOD, flows are estimated using an internationally
consistent methodology. This is crucial for cross-country comparisons such as this paper.
The requirement of international consistency is ruling out the use of micro data on
procurement, which exist only for few countries and years. The trade effects of PTAs
have been studied previously by Rickard and Kono (2014). They rely on changes in the
elasticity of imports to procurement spending as an indirect measure of the trade effects.
The availability of direct flows, if partially imputed, through international input output
tables makes direct estimation of the trade effects of PP provisions possible.
Rickard and Kono (2014) find no measureable effects of PTA PP provisions on the
import elasticity of trade. They explain this with a lack of legal enforceability of the
PP provisions and the erection of non-tariff barriers in public procurement in response
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to reductions in direct tariff barriers. A novel classification of PP provisions in PTAs
enables me to test this conjecture directly. Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) analyze the
public procurement provisions in all PTAs notified to the WTO up to March 2017, using
a detailed questionnaire. They then use their detailed qualitative assessment to classify
agreements into three broad categories according to the ‘depth’ or legal enforcability of
these provisions.4 This classification opens up the possibility of systematically investigating
the trade effects of those agreements quantitatively.
I estimate the effect of PP provisions as classified by Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) on
value added trade flows absorbed by government consumption constructed from WIOD,
using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator proposed by Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2006). I include importer-time, exporter-time and importer-exporter
pair fixed effects in the specification. These account succinctly and comprehensively
for a range of standard controls in gravity estimation (Y. V. Yotov et al. 2016). In
the main specification, bilateral links covered by enforceable agreements are associated
with statistically significantly higher trade volume, relative to links covered by shallow
provisions or no PTA at all. Investigating the effects on sectoral levels, it becomes clear
that aggregate flows are driven primarily by service sector imports.
A large share of bilateral links in the baseline sample are trade flows between member
states of the European Union (EU), due to the WIOD country coverage. The EU negotiates
all trade agreements on behalf of its member countries at the supra-national level. In
addition, procurement rules in the EU are designed to foster non-discrimination and are
viewed as part of the EU’s Single Market (Cantore and Togan 2017). This sets the EU
procurement rules appart from the PP provisions of other PTAs. I therefore reestimate
the baseline results on an additional, smaller sample that treats inner-EU trade flows
as domestic and focuses on extra-EU trade flows between the EU and third countries
only. The statistical significance of the association between enforceable PP provisions and
the size of the underlying trade flow vanishes completely. Inspecting the composition of
bilateral flows over time, it becomes apparent that the variation in the baseline sample is
primarily driven by intra-EU flows.5
These results are consistent with prior findings in the literature. Rickard and Kono (2014)
4In the following, I will use the terms deep provisions and (legally) enforceable provisions interchange-
ably. In the detailed questionnaire, Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) explicitly cover legal enforceability.
More than 90% of the agreements included in their deep PP provisions group contain provisions to ensure
legal enforceability.
5In particular, variation is driven by the accession of new member states to the EU throughout the
sample period, especially in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania).
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emphasize the level of enforceability as crucial. Enforceability within the EU is higher
than in other international agreements, as with the European Commission there is a joint
agency ensuring compliance of member states and an EU-level judicial system exists.
Tas et al. (2017) study procurement outcomes in the European Economic Area (EEA),
Switzerland and Macedonia for tenders covered by GPA rules using micro-level tender
data released by the EU and find that procurement is more open than for tenders not
covered by the GPA. Cantore and Togan (2017) analyze EU procurement regulation and
view it as generally consistent with GPA rules. Three out of four PTA PP provisions
classified as deep Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) are categorized as en par or exceeding
the level of coverage prescribed by the GPA. I view this as additional evidence that legal
enforceability of provisions is indeed crucial for seeing real effects on trade flows.
The body of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I present more information
on the Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) PTA classification and the trade flow data from
the World Input Output Database. The empirical methodology and baseline results are
presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the results on the second sample, considering
only EU tradeflows with third parties. Section 3.5 concludes. Two appendices contain
additional detail on WIOD and present several additional robustness checks.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) PTA Classification
The main goal of this paper is to assess the importance of enforceability of procurement
provisions on the actual trade impact of the agreement. To this end, I make use of a
novel classification of public procurement provisions present in PTAs by Shingal and
Ereshchenko (2018). Their classification is based on a questionnaire approach including
100 specific questions across 8 broad categories. Responses are either binary or detailed,
enabling a classification of PP clauses at both extensive and intensive margins.6 Based
on the detailed questionnaire, Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) classify the agreements
into three groups, enabling quantitative comparison of the relative coverage and depth
of the PP provisions across PTAs. The novelty of their approach comes from combining
a in-depth qualitative assessment of PP clauses, similar to Anderson et al. (2011) and
Ueno (2013), with a classification amenable to quantitative use. Dür, Baccini, and Elsig
(2014) also categorize PP provisions in an index in their DESTA database, however, their
assessment is based on a much smaller number of questions.
6Their 8 categories, with the respective number of questions in parantheses, are Overview (4),
Non-discrimination (14), Coverage (40), Ex-ante transparency (3), Procedural disciplines (26), Ex-post
transparency (4), Dispute settlement (4) and “New” issues (4).
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Table 3.1: PTA Classification Sample
provisions enforceable count share
No No 16 0.36
Yes No 17 0.38
Yes Yes 12 0.27
Total 45 1.01
Note: Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018)
agreements involving at least two coun-
tries covered by WIOD, 2016 revision.
Deviations of total share from 1 due to
rounding errors.
Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) provide a broad classification of PTAs by the type of
PP provisions they include. PTAs are classified into three groups. First, PTAs without
reference to government procurement and containing no PP provisions. Second, PTAs
which include either brief references to PP or a full chapter, but without legally binding
text (shallow PP provisions). Third, agreements including detailed PP provisions or
explicitly referencing the inclusion of GPA provisions (deep PP provisions).
A disaggregation by PP classification of the number of agreements in the sample is
presented in Table 3.1. In principle, the Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) database covers
all PTAs which have been notified to the WTO up until March 2017, however the associated
trade flow data used in this paper is based on data from the WIOD, 2016 revision. In
this paper, I will therefore focus on the subset of agreements covered by Shingal and
Ereshchenko (2018) which entered into force up until December 2014 and involve at least
two countries in the WIOD sample, i.e. only agreements which cover some of the bilateral
flows in the sample. This criterion results in a sample of 45 agreements. The agreements
covered are about evenly distributed by PP classification, with agreements featuring deep
or enforceable PP provisions having the lowest share at about 27%.
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Number of Agreements in Effect
While Table 3.1 presents shares over the entire WIOD sample period from 2000 to 2014,
Figure 3.1 plots the number and relative shares of agreement types which are currently in
force for all years of the sample separately. The absolute number of PTAs in force expands
throughout the sample period both overall and for all classifications. The relative share
of agreements including shallow or deep PP provisions increases throughout the sample
period, however, not uniformely and not substantially.
The patterns in Figure 3.1 imply that while the absolute number of PTAs with deep
provisions increases, their share among agreements currently in force does not raise
substantially. Importantly, here all agreements are weighted equally, irrespective of the
number of member countries or the size of trade flows governed by the agreement. When
disaggregating bilateral trade flows by type of agreement covering them, the picture
changes (see Subsection 3.2.3 below).
3.2.2 World Input Output Database
The World Input Output Database (M. P. Timmer et al. 2015) combines national accounts
data and data on trade flows to estimate full international input output tables, including
international industry-to-industry flows and a split of final demand categories by country-
industry source. The WIOD, revision 2016 data covers 43 countries, plotted in Figure
3.2.7 Despite the limited country coverage, WIOD covers more than 85% of World GDP
throughout the sample period (Dengler and Hoekman 2018).
7The differences of the 2016 revision of WIOD relative to the first release are described in further
detail by M. Timmer et al. (2016).
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Figure 3.2: World Input Output Database Country Coverage
WIOD Sample Countries
In this paper, the split of final demand categories by country-industry source is of particular
importance, since it enables an analysis of public sector consumption demand disaggregated
by country. WIOD data has a couple of advantages over other datasets. Since WIOD
features complete international input output flows, it is possible to calculate value added
imports by final demand category in addition to direct gross imports. Other databases,
e.g. GTAP, also split final demand categories by country source, however, due to the
lack of complete international input output tables, it is not possible to compute value
added imports. For other databases that do include value added trade, e.g. OECD TiVA,
coverage extends only up to 2011, whereas the latest release of WIOD covers flows up to
2014.
The main analysis is done on value added import flows rather than gross import flows.
Gross imports from Country A to Country B are simply direct bilateral flows from A
to B absorbed by public final consumption demand in B, aggregated over all industries.
Value added imports are tracking the actual foreign content embedded in public final
consumption demand both foreign and domestic. One general advantage of using value
added imports is avoiding double-counting of trade flows in the case of re-exports.
In the context of public procurement, value added flows have a second advantage. Relying
on gross import flows only captures direct imports of the government sector. However, in
practice indirect imports, e.g. via domestic subsidiaries of foreign companies are magnitudes
larger than direct imports.8 The value added flows do not directly correspond to foreign
ownership measures. However, to the extend to which foreign subsidiaries are more likely
8Ramboll and Chur (2011) report for the EU that on average in 2009 just 1.4 percent of tenders were
awarded to foreign bidders directly, while 11.4 percent were awarded indirectly. In terms of tender value,
the numbers are equally striking with 3.4 percent directly and 15.7 percent indirectly awarded to foreign
bidders.
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Table 3.2: Government Consumption Industry Decomposition
Total Flow Decomp. Import Flow Decomp. Foreign Content Shares
industry GO VA GO VA GO VA
man 1.27 7.10 58.26 37.84 53.97 33.69
ser 98.08 88.22 40.87 47.70 0.49 3.42
oth 0.65 4.68 0.86 14.46 1.57 19.53
tot 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.17 6.32
Data: WIOD, revision 2016. Note: The ’Total Flow Decomposition’ columns show the
decomposition of total government consumption by economic sector, the ’Import Flow
Decomposition’ columns show the decomposition of government consumption imports.
The ’Foreign Content Shares’ columns show the share of imports in the total government
consumption demand from the respective industry. All shares are GDP-weighted sample
averages. The service sector is defined as the aggregate of ISIC Rev. 4 industries G - S.
to source from their parent companies abroad than domestic bidders, this will be reflected
in the value added import flows. More directly, PP clauses preventing application of
domestic rules of origin type regulations will be directly reflected in value added import
flows (of both domestic companies and foreign subsidiaries), while these type of changes
will not be captured at all in gross import flows.
The calculation of value added imports follows the methodology of Koopman, Wang, and
Wei (2014). The authors propose a new method for decomposing gross trade flows into
several value added compontents. For this paper, the foreign value added component is
of interest. Further details on the construction of variables and some additional stylized
facts are presented in Appendix 3.A.
Table 3.2 shows total government consumption and imports disaggregated by industry plus
the general foreign content shares of the different sectors for both gross output and value
added. The first two columns show the strong orientation of government consumption
expenditures towards services. Over 98 percent of overall gross expenditures and over 88
percent of value added are spent on services. In contrast, when looking at import flows
only, manufactured goods make for a much larger share of the overall share. In the case of
gross output, the share is even larger than that of services.
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Table 3.3: Bilateral Trade Flow Sample
flow type agreement provisions enforceable count share
domestic - - - 645 0.02
international No No No 16642 0.60
international Yes No No 686 0.02
international Yes Yes No 1464 0.05
international Yes Yes Yes 8298 0.30
Total 27735 0.99
Note: Bilateral trade flows in WIOD sample, pooled over all sample
years (2000 – 2014) and disaggregated by Shingal and Ereshchenko
(2018) agreement classification coverage. Deviation of total share
from 1 due to rounding errors.
3.2.3 Bilateral trade flows
For the regressions in this paper, information on bilateral public consumption imports from
WIOD are complemented by information on the kind of agreement covering the respective
bilateral flow from the Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) classification. A disaggregation of
the bilateral flows by the type of agreement covering the respective flow is presented in
Table 3.3.
While the relative number of agreements by type in the sample is relatively balanced
(see Table 3.1), the relative number of bilateral trade flows is biased towards flows which
are not governed by any agreement and flows governed by agreements with deep and
enforceable PP provisions. This difference stems from two characteristics of the data. First,
agreements differ in the number of member countries. Agreements with more members will
translate into an over-proportional number of bilateral flows. Second, the WIOD data is
biased towards European countries, since it covers all EU members. Since trade relations
are identical for all EU member countries, agreements involving the EU are ‘replicated’
in the bilateral flows data for each EU member country. In order to address the second
feature, the main results are replicated on a bilateral flow sample treating the EU as a
single country in Section 3.4.
Figure 3.3 decomposes this data further for each year of the sample. It can be seen that the
share of bilateral trade flows governed by deep and enforceable agreements is increasing
between 2000 to 2014 from 12% to over 42% of all international flows. This stands in
contrast to the stagnant share of the overall relative number of agreements (see Figure
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3.1), implying that deep agreements are becoming larger over time.





























Bilateral Flows by Agreement Type
Note: Unweighted annual share of bilateral flows by type of agreement coverage.
3.3 Estimation
In this Section I present the bilateral gravity regression exercise. The estimation strategy
will be outlined in the next Subsection, before results are presented subsequently.
3.3.1 Estimation Strategy
The aim of the analysis is to test to which extent deep and legally enforceable PP provisions
have an impact on openness of government consumption demand. The gravity model has
emerged as a workhorse model for this type of questions (Y. V. Yotov et al. (2016)). The
bilateral gravity framework is consistent with the main theoretical models of international
trade and directly maps theoretical counterparts into the available data.
For the baseline specification, I estimate the effect of PTA PP provisions on bilateral
trade flows using the Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) PPML estimator, as recommended
by Y. V. Yotov et al. (2016). This differs from Dhingra, Freeman, and Mavroeidi (2018),
who employ a fixed-effects (FE) estimator instead.
The PPML estimator has several advantages over FE. First, it enables the researcher to
include zero flows in the estimation, which would have to be dropped in the log-linearized
FE specification. In public sector imports, in particular gross imports, zero flows are more
prevalent than in general trade data, making this concern particularly salient. Second, the
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PPML estimator takes care of potential heteroscedasticity of trade flows. Heteroscedasticity
is problematic for the FE estimator, since the log-transformation does not treat positive
and negative errors symetrically. Third, Larch et al. (2017) provide a new, computationally
efficient implementation of the PPML estimator, reducing the computational burden in
the presence of high-dimensional fixed effects.
Based on Larch et al. (2017), the reduced form equation to be estimated is given by
Xijt = exp (φit + ψjt + γij + βTAijt) + εjit (3.1)
where Xijt is the (gross or value added) part of the overall trade flow from Country i to
Country j that is absorbed by government consumption demand in Country j at time t,
φit is an exporter-time fixed effect, ψjt is an importer-time fixed effect, γij is a country-pair
fixed effect and TAijt is a vector of policy variables describing the trade regime governing
the respective bilateral flow. The overall effect of the agreement TAijt is disaggregated
into three indicator variables, indicating the presence of a gerneral trade agreement
(independently from PP coverage), presence of a public procurement provisions (shallow
or deep) in the agreement and presence of deep and enforceable public procurement
provisions as follows
βTAijt = β1Agreementjit + β2Provisionsjit + β3Enforceablejit. (3.2)
The variables are thus defined as subsets of their respective predecessors, i.e. Enforceable
is always zero if Provisions is zero and Provisions is always zero if Agreement is zero.
This approach follows the setup of Dhingra, Freeman, and Mavroeidi (2018).
The effects of PTA provisions on bilateral trade flows are likely to materialize fully at
medium to low frequency, since agents need time to adjust to the change of rules. I
therefore follow the convention in the bilateral gravity literature and estimate the baseline
specification at 4 year intervals. In addition, this isolates the estimates from high frequency
annual variation. In order to exploit the recency of the WIOD 2016 revision, I include
data for 2014 in every specification. The baseline sample thus includes bilateral trade
flows for 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014.9
9For comparison to Dhingra, Freeman, and Mavroeidi (2018)’s baseline specification of two year
intervals, results from reestimating the baseline specification at this higher frequency are presented in
Appendix ??. While the coefficients are quantitatively smaller, the main qualitative patterns continue
to hold. This incidentially lends support to the adjustment time hypothesis motivating the use of lower
frequency data by the literature in the first place.
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Including a full set of country-time and country-pair fixed effects precludes the inclusion
of country membership in the WTO GPA in the policy vector in equation ??. Membership
in the GPA has been virtually constant over the sample period, implying that GPA
membership is not identified in the presence of country-pair fixed effects.10
3.3.2 Baseline Results
The main estimates of interest are the policy parameters on the different types of agree-
ment. As these are indicator variables, the trade volume effect in percentage terms is
calculated from the estimates as
(eβ̂policy − 1) · 100 (3.3)
where β̂policy is the respective policy estimate (Y. V. Yotov et al. (2016)). The joint effect
of two types of policies can be obtained by summing the point estimates as
(eβ̂p1+β̂p2 − 1) · 100. (3.4)
Baseline regression results for total value added import flows into the government sector
are presented in Table 3.4. Regressing bilateral trade flows on the PTA classficiations
separately in Models (1) to (3) yields the following results. When calculating the estimated
percentage effect using equation ?? for all PTAs – PP provisions or not – with 25.83
percent the effect is smaller than when looking only at those PTAs with shallow provisions,
with 29.7 percent, or those with deep provisions, which are associated with a 31.33 percent
trade volume increase over trade flows not covered by any agreement. This is consistent
with the interpretation that the type of provision actually matters.
The overall effect of PP provisions in specification (4) is large and jointly significant.
Relative to flows not covered by a PP provision, government consuption import flows are
higher by 31.33 percent, using the transformation ??. When looking at the disaggregation
between shallow and deep provisions, it can be seen that the coefficient on enforceable
PP provisions is much larger than the coefficient on shallow provisions and statistically
significant, albeight only at the 5% level. While shallow provisions are not associated
with trade volume significantly higher than trade flows not governed by any form of PP
provisions, deep provisions are estimated to go along with a 20.94 higher import volume
10The sole exceptions are the EU accession countries. GPA accession is coincidental with EU accession.
Given the large changes in PP rules and regulations associated with becoming an EU member, potential
specific effects of GPA membership are arguably impossible to identify separately.
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Table 3.4: Total imports - VA - 4 year frequency
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.2298∗∗∗ 0.0120
(0.0391) (0.1007)
provisions 0.2600∗∗∗ 0.0932 0.0814
(0.0253) (0.0898) (0.1350)
enforcable 0.2726∗∗∗ 0.1902∗ 0.1970∗
(0.0262) (0.0933) (0.0942)
N 7396 7396 7396 7396 7396
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
by the importer’s government consumption. When taking into account in addition any
type of PTA in Specification (5), the size of the effect rises slightly to 21.77 percent while
significance levels remain the same.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present the baseline results for services and manufacturing flows
separately. The aggregate results are clearly driven by the service sector imports. This is
to be expected, as Table 3.2 shows that services trade dominates the overall trade flows
into the government sector. While qualitatively the services flows are very similar to the
aggregate flows, quantitatively they are larger. For manufacturing flows, enforceability
of PP provisions does not appear to be associated with higher trade volumes. According
to the Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) classification, 65% of shallow agreements do not
cover services in addition to manufacturing. This might explain why the effects of shallow
agreements bear out more strongly when looking at manufacturing trade flows only.
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Table 3.5: Services imports - VA - 4 year frequency
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.2697∗∗∗ 0.0561
(0.0322) (0.0585)
provisions 0.2841∗∗∗ 0.0557 −0.0000
(0.0298) (0.1231) (0.1361)
enforcable 0.2992∗∗∗ 0.2542∗ 0.2726∗
(0.0306) (0.1266) (0.1272)
N 7396 7396 7396 7396 7396
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
Table 3.6: Manufacturing imports - VA - 4 year frequency
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.2698∗∗∗ 0.0830
(0.0568) (0.1115)
provisions 0.2994∗∗∗ 0.1828∗∗ 0.1005
(0.0459) (0.0591) (0.1245)
enforcable 0.3107∗∗∗ 0.1336 0.1474
(0.0499) (0.0730) (0.0753)
N 7396 7396 7396 7396 7396
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
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3.4 EU as a single entity
Trade flows are generated at the national level and procurement is a domain of national
and sub-national government entities. Thus, the main analysis is focused on investigating
the relationship between government consumption import and international agreements
on the national bilateral level. Generally, trade agreements are negotiated on the national
level as well, making the country-level perspective the natural choice.
An important exception to the national responsibility for PP and trade agreements is
the European Union. In the context of this paper, the EU is particularly relevant, since
EU member states constitute the majority of the WIOD sample countries with 28 out
of 43 countries in total (c.f. Figure 3.2).11 For EU member countries, decision making
potentially differs from the national level for two reasons relevant to this paper. First, all
trade agreements are exclusively negotiated at EU level, i.e. individual member states
are unable to separately negotiate any form of agreement. Second, the EU has strong
non-discrimination clauses in public procurement regarding firms from other member
states as part of the EU common market. Assuming the EU PP clauses are perfectly
binding, all member states de facto constitute a single PP market. From perspective taken
in this paper the EU could be interpreted as a single country, as both the procurement
market and trade agreements comprise all EU member countries simultaneously.
In addition to the ‘EU as a country’ argument just outlined, including the EU member
countries separately potentially creates quantitative biases in the baseline results for the
following reasons. First, a large part of the agreements covering sample links will involve
the EU. This could potentially be of concern, if the EU negotiates all its agreements in a
similar way, implying less variation in type of agreements observed in the sample. Second,
all agreements involving the EU are ‘multiplied’ by the number of EU member states.
Since level of observations are bilateral links, this gives agreements involving the EU a
much higher weight in the overall number of observations, potentially biasing the results.
This section therefore presents the baseline specifications re-estimated on an EU sample.
Here, all flows from EU members to non-members have been collapsed and trade flows
between EU members are treated as ‘domestic’ EU flows. In order to explore the concerns of
sample bias and lack of variability, the next Subsection presents a set of summary statistics
for this sample before regression results are presented in the subsequent Subsection.
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Table 3.7: Bilateral Trade Flow Sample
flow type agreement provisions enforceable count share
domestic - - - 240 0.06
international No No No 2848 0.74
international Yes No No 404 0.11
international Yes Yes No 132 0.03
international Yes Yes Yes 216 0.06
Total 3840 1.00
Note: Bilateral trade flows in WIOD sample, pooled over all sample
years (2000 – 2014) and disaggregated by Shingal and Ereshchenko
(2018) agreement classification coverage. Deviation of total share
from 1 due to rounding errors.
3.4.1 Summary Statistics on EU level
A disaggregation of bilateral trade flows by agreement coverage type is presented in Table
3.7. The overall number of bilateral flows is 3840, substantially lower than in the baseline
sample with over 27,000. The difference reflects the potential size of the bias and stems
from the nature of the bilateral flows, the number of which grows exponentially in the
number of partners. Compared to the baseline sample (presented in Table 3.3), an even
larger share of the observations is not covered by any type of agreement. Among the
bilateral flows covered by agreements, the observations are now more evenly distributed
among no PP provisions, shallow and deep provisions. This reflects the removal of intra-EU
flows, which have been classified as being covered by a PTA with deep provisions.
11The WIOD project was originally funded by the European Commission through its 7th Framework
Program, explaining the bias towards European countries.
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Bilateral Flows by Agreement Type
Note: Unweighted annual share of bilateral flows by type of agreement coverage.
EU member states collapsed into single country.
Figure 3.4 further disaggregates the distribution of flows over time. While the share of
bilateral observations covered by international agreements with various PP classifications
continuously grows, the intertemporal variability is substantially lower than in the baseline
sample.
Inspecting the bilateral flow distribution of the EU sample reveals mixed implications. On
the one hand, the EU bias in terms of share of observations is removed, at the cost of a
much smaller sample. On the other hand, the resulting sample seems even less balanced
than the baseline sample, in terms of both cross-sectional and inter-temporal variability
between agreement types covering the flows.
3.4.2 Regression results on EU level
Regression results for the EU sample are presented in Table 3.8 for total bilateral flows,
Table 3.9 for manufacturing sector import flows and Table 3.10 for service sector import
flows.
The results are starkly different from the baseline case – statistical significance basically
vanishes from all specifications. In models (4) and (5), the presence of enforceable provisions
now has a negative sign, albeight insignificant as well. The results put into question the
robustness and the interpretation of the relationships seen in the baseline sample. At the
same time, the summary statistics on this robustness sample discussed in the previous
Subsection indicate that the results should be interpreted with care.
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Table 3.8: results-eu-va-gov-tot-4years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement −0.0124 −0.1487
(0.0745) (0.1266)
provisions 0.0213 0.1240 0.2724
(0.0507) (0.1170) (0.1721)
enforcable 0.0082 −0.1239 −0.1234
(0.0428) (0.1239) (0.1241)
N 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.9976 0.9955
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
In summary, the EU sample robustness exercise qualifies the baseline results. At the same
time, also the robustness sample suffers from a lack of variability in the main explanatory
variables. Overall, this suggests that the WIOD sample is not idealy suited to study the
effect of PTA PP provision classification on public sector openness. In particular, a larger
set of countries with appropriate data would be desirable. Since so far, this is not available,
the baseline results of this paper should be taken with a grain of salt.
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Table 3.9: results-eu-va-gov-man-4years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.0112 −0.0831
(0.0790) (0.1458)
provisions 0.0628 0.1839∗ 0.2669
(0.0617) (0.0810) (0.1654)
enforcable 0.0178 −0.1836 −0.1831
(0.0624) (0.1003) (0.1004)
N 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.9954 0.9901
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
Table 3.10: results-eu-va-gov-ser-4years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.0155 −0.0451
(0.0589) (0.0979)
provisions 0.0213 0.1140 0.1523
(0.0695) (0.1579) (0.1828)
enforcable 0.0142 −0.1139 −0.1069
(0.0619) (0.1682) (0.1653)
N 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.9987 0.9958
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates whether bilateral trade links covered by deep and legally enforceable
PP provisions are associated with higher trade flows absorbed by government consumption
in the importing country using a new classification of PP provisions and value added
public sector trade flows constructed from the World Input Output Database. I find that
enforceability is indeed associated with significantly higher trade flows, however, this result
is driven primarily by developments in the European Union. Once excluding intra-EU
trade, the association between PP provision type and size of the underlying trade flow
vanishes.
This result is consistent with the existing literature investigating the effects of PP provisions
on trade. Using a more indirect measure of government imports, Rickard and Kono (2014)
find no effect of PTA PP provisions on trade. They attribute this to non-tariff barriers
and a lack of legal enforceability of the PTA provisions. Tas et al. (2017) investigate
procurement tenders in the EU and do find tangible effects of the GPA. The results
presented in this paper further strengthen the hypothesis that legal enforceability is
crucial in achieving tangible results on trade flows from international commitments.
The analysis in this paper is subject to some caveats. First, a robustness exercise in
Appendix 3.B.3 using a placebo variable regression does not strengthen a potential causal
mechanism for the baseline regression results. Reestimating the baseline regressions on
private consumption value added imports (arguably unaffected by PTA PP provisions)
generates qualitatively very similar results to the baseline estimation. The results from
this exercise should be interpreted with care, since the Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018)
classification covers only the PP provisions of the respective PTAs. To the extend that
PTAs with deeper PP provisions are also those PTAs with deeper provisions regarding the
private sector, the results from the placebo exercise could be driven by omitted variable
bias.
Second, the World Input Output Database might not be the ideal source of trade flow
data, due to its bias towards European countries. In particular South America and Asian
countries are not sufficiently covered, limiting the number of PTAs included in the sample.
The choice of WIOD data for this analysis is motivated by the necessity of having to
split trade flows by the nature of final demand absorbing them in the importing country.
Given that other datasets covering a more comprehensive set of countries, such as the
GTAP project, do not feature full international input-output tables at the time of writing,
WIOD currently provides the most comprehensive possibility for testing the hypothesis of
this paper.
Finally, a number of agreements have not been included in the sample as they have been
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coming into effect only in the years following 2014, the final sample year of WIOD, 2016
revision. A more complete assessment of the effectiveness of PTA PP provisions will have
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3.A World Input Output Database
This appendix contains additional detail on sample selection and variable construction
for WIOD based variables, plus some more data descriptive statistics. For the analysis,
inter-country flows of public consumption final demand gross and value added imports
are constructed from WIOD data. There are m = 56 industries and n = 43 countries in
the database.12 WIOD input output tables are symmetric, i.e. consuming and producing
industries are the same. An element in the inter-country input output table is given by
xijkl, implying a flow from from industry i in country k to industry j in country l.
In this paper, we are interested in inter-country flows only. Construction of gross flows
is straightforward by summing the country-industry origin of public final consumption
demand over industries by country of origin. Value added flows are constructed adapting
the Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014) methodology. In particular, country-industry value
added content of public final demand V A(FDgov) is computed by
V A(FDgov) = V̂ ·B · FDgov
where V̂ is a mn×mn diagonal matrix with country-industry value added shares on the
main diagonal, B = (I − A)−1 is the mn × mn country-industry Leontief inverse and
FDgov is a mn× n matrix with rows of country-industry flows absorbed by public sector
consumption final demand in each country. Each element (ik, l) of V A(FDgov) then gives
the value added content from country-industry ik in the public sector consumption final
demand of country l. Country-to-country value added flows are then obtained similarly to
gross flows by summing the country-industry flows over industries by country of origin.
In the remainder of this Subsection, some additional descriptive statistics are presented.
Figure 3.5 shows import shares for public consumption final demand for each country,
aggregated over all trade partners. It can be seen that foreign value added content is
consistently substantially higher than for gross imports, for some countries substantially.
12In addition, there is a Rest of the World aggregate (ROW). Since it cannot be determined which
type of agreement flows involving ROW are covered by, all flows from, to and within ROW are dropped
from the analysis.
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Figure 3.5: Gross and Value Added Government Import Shares
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Figure 3.6: Value Added Government Import Flow Decomposition by Sector
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Government Consumption Value Added Import Flow Decomposition by Sector
Data: Author's calculations based on WIOD, rev. 2016. Notes: Services sector defined as ISIC Rev. 4 industries G − S. 
3.B Robustness
This appendix contains a number of robustness exercises.
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Table 3.11: results-va-gov-tot-2years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.2236∗∗∗ 0.0890
(0.0384) (0.0765)
provisions 0.2451∗∗∗ 0.0890 0.0005
(0.0334) (0.0677) (0.1010)
enforcable 0.2556∗∗∗ 0.1765∗ 0.1875∗
(0.0361) (0.0761) (0.0773)
N 14792 14792 14792 14792 14792
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
3.B.1 Two-year panel
For comparison with Dhingra, Freeman, and Mavroeidi (2018), whose main results are
estimated using 2 year intervals, the baseline results are reestimated on that frequency.
The sample includes bilateral trade flows for every second year from 2000 through 2014.
Results are presented in Table 3.11 for total value added imports, in Table 3.12 for
value added manufacturing imports and in Table 3.13 for value added services imports.
While quantitatively the estimated effects is slightly smaller than in the 4 year interval
baseline, the qualitative pattern and significance levels are very similar. These results
are consistent with the hypothesis that the economic effects of PTAs require some time
to fully materialize. Y. V. Yotov et al. (2016) cite this as the main reason the literature
focuses on longer time intervals.
3.B.2 Gross public import flows
The baseline results are presented using the foreign value added content of government
consumption expenditures. I argue that this is the preferred way of measuring import
flows on theoretical grounds, since it arguably better captures the main modes of PP
imports via foreign subsidiaries (c.f. Ramboll and Chur (2011)). Furthermore, the value
added measures is net of re-export double-counting flows present in gross trade flows.
Nonetheless, for robustness, results for gross trade flows are presented in Table 3.14 for
total public import flows. Like in the value added case, each PTA categorization is strongly
significant when tested separately. REsults change when looking at the separate effect
102
Table 3.12: results-va-gov-man-2years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.2609∗∗∗ 0.1402
(0.0557) (0.0861)
provisions 0.2850∗∗∗ 0.1960∗∗∗ 0.0571
(0.0552) (0.0490) (0.0964)
enforcable 0.2917∗∗∗ 0.1006 0.1193
(0.0601) (0.0708) (0.0734)
N 14792 14792 14792 14792 14792
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
of shallow and deep provisions. While still jointly significant, neither shallow nor deep
provisions are significant individually. Furthermore, the coefficient on shallow provisions
is substantially larger. When turning to model (5), only the general agreement coefficient
is significant, while the presence and nature of specific PP clauses does not significantly
increase the effect (the joint effect is still significantly positive).
When looking at the results for manufacturing and services. separately in Tables 3.15 and
3.16 respectively, results are qualitatively different from the baseline results as well. While
for value added imports, the overall results are driven by services, for gross imports both
coefficient values and significance levels are higher for manufacturing than for services.
For both specifications (4) and (5), enforceability of PP provisions is associated with
significancly higher manufacturing import flows to the government sector. In model (5)
for the manufacturing sector, agreements with enforceable provisions are associated with
significantly higher flows than general PTAs without specific PP provisions. In contrast
to the manfucaturing results, when looking at the service sector and gross imports the
nature of PP provisions is not associated with significantly higher flows. This again stands
in contrast to the value added flows.
3.B.3 Placebo regression
A general drawback of the econometric strategy is the lack of truly exogenous variation.
Potentially, in the current context this problem can be substantial. Trade agreements are
actively sought and negotiated, making it potentially likely that there will be a selection
effect in who signs a (deep) agreement with whom and who does not. To corroborate the
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Table 3.13: results-va-gov-ser-2years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.2612∗∗∗ 0.1224
(0.0386) (0.0627)
provisions 0.2701∗∗∗ 0.0312 −0.0909
(0.0384) (0.0928) (0.1111)
enforcable 0.2843∗∗∗ 0.2579∗ 0.2678∗∗
(0.0414) (0.1009) (0.1020)
N 14792 14792 14792 14792 14792
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
main findings, the design features of trade agreements allow for a placebo exercise. The
idea is to redo the main analysis with an alternative outcome variable that is independent
of the explanatory policy variable of interest. If the policy variable truly causally influences
the original outcome variable, the effects on the placebo outcome should be insignificant.
The design of trade agreements offers a natrual placebo outcome variable. By definition,
PP clauses affect the public sector exclusively. This implies that trade flows of private
actors should not be affected by the design of PP provisions by definition. For the placebo
exercise, I therefore test the effect of PP provisions on non-governmental consumption
import flows.
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 3.17 for total bilateral flows, Table 3.18
for manufacturing sector import flows and Table 3.19 for service sector import flows.
Results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the public sector regressions
for both aggregate and sector-specific flows. Prima facie this can be seen as evidence
against causal interpretatility of the main results. Alternatively, it could also indicate the
presence of a confounding factor, casting doubt on the validity of the placebo. In particular,
the Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) classification concerns exclusively PP provisions. If
‘deeper’ PP provisions are more likely to be included in agreements containing ‘deeper’
general provisions as well, then the results could be reflecting an omitted variable bias,
since in the regression deep PP provisions could proxy for deep general provisions. Since
Shingal and Ereshchenko (2018) do not categorize PTAs by their general deepness beyond
the public sector, this cannot be tested given the currently available data. One conclusion
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Table 3.14: results-go-gov-tot-4years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.3269∗∗∗ 0.2300∗∗
(0.0534) (0.0786)
provisions 0.3203∗∗∗ 0.2990 0.0722
(0.0497) (0.2138) (0.2268)
enforcable 0.3206∗∗∗ 0.0295 0.1418
(0.0510) (0.2192) (0.2204)
N 7396 7396 7396 7396 7396
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
however could be that in order to test the strength of PP provisions, potentially it might
be necessary to include additional information on the PTAs concerning the general ‘depth’
of the agreement, also beyond the government sector.
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Table 3.15: results-go-gov-man-4years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.6539∗∗∗ 0.5268∗∗∗
(0.1205) (0.1302)
provisions 0.5658∗∗∗ 0.0302 −0.4959
(0.1077) (0.2437) (0.2715)
enforcable 0.5813∗∗∗ 0.5467∗ 0.6521∗
(0.1098) (0.2600) (0.2674)
N 7388 7388 7388 7388 7388
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
Table 3.16: results-go-gov-ser-4years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.2202∗∗∗ −0.2523
(0.0603) (0.1485)
provisions 0.2345∗∗∗ 0.2471 0.5041
(0.0570) (0.2234) (0.2698)
enforcable 0.2339∗∗∗ −0.0393 −0.2059
(0.0586) (0.2303) (0.2351)
N 7396 7396 7396 7396 7396
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.0004 0.4829
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
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Table 3.17: results-va-con-tot-4years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.2030∗∗∗ 0.0007
(0.0404) (0.0931)
provisions 0.2388∗∗∗ 0.0400 0.0395
(0.0284) (0.0930) (0.1317)
enforcable 0.2592∗∗∗ 0.2212∗ 0.2234∗
(0.0276) (0.0961) (0.0968)
N 7396 7396 7396 7396 7396
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
Table 3.18: results-va-con-man-4years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.2606∗∗∗ 0.1043
(0.0411) (0.0888)
provisions 0.2827∗∗∗ 0.2368∗∗∗ 0.1333
(0.0319) (0.0583) (0.1055)
enforcable 0.2854∗∗∗ 0.0519 0.0671
(0.0346) (0.0649) (0.0660)
N 7396 7396 7396 7396 7396
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
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Table 3.19: results-va-con-ser-4years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
agreement 0.2233∗∗∗ 0.0014
(0.0398) (0.0767)
provisions 0.2465∗∗∗ −0.1093 −0.1102
(0.0364) (0.1342) (0.1544)
enforcable 0.2807∗∗∗ 0.3697∗∗ 0.3784∗∗
(0.0329) (0.1373) (0.1378)
N 7396 7396 7396 7396 7396
exporter-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
importer-time FE 1 1 1 1 1
Pair FE 1 1 1 1 1
Joint sign. (p-val) 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter.
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Chapter 4
Determinants of Input Price
Dispersion
This Chapter is joint work with Árpád Ábrahám and T. Kirk White. 1
Abstract
Two recent contributions document that (a) supply chain considerations are not the prime
focus of vertical integration and (b) input prices display substantial heterogeneity across
U.S. firms. This paper outlines a strategy to empirically test whether vertical integration
and input price dispersion are related, using unique features of U.S. Economic Census
micro data that have already been employed by Atalay et al. (2014) and Atalay (2014).
In particular, we argue that owning productive capacities upstream endows firms with
informational or bargaining advantages which result in lower procurement prices. We
propose to decompose input price dispersion in a between-supplier and a within-supplier
component in order to investigate how both components contribute to the input price
advantage of vertically integrated firms. This project aims at shedding light on the
determinants of measured firm productivity. Input price dispersion through the between-
supplier component predicts measured productivity dispersion through supplier selection,
while within-supplier price dispersion implies that measured productivity dispersion is
driven by differences in supplier market power.
1Some of the research in this paper was conducted while the third author was an employee of Census
Bureau. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily




Motivation The majority of the economics literature on Vertical Integration (VI) is
rationalizing integration decisions with supply chain considerations. However, Atalay,
Hortaçsu, and Syverson (2014) present evidence that supply chain considerations are not
the primary reason for the existence of vertically integrated firms, using establishment-
and shipment-level data of the Census of Manufactures (CM) and the Commodity Flow
Survey (CFS). In fact, more than half of all vertically integrated establishments feature
zero intra-firm shipments (see Fig. 1 below, reproducing their main result).
In a related paper, Atalay (2014) shows that even in industries characterized by commodity-
like products, there is substantial input price dispersion. He focuses on the consequences
of accounting for both plant level input and output prices in the estimation of plant
productivity. Importantly, Atalay (2014) relaxes perfect competition in input markets by
allowing firm specific prices. However, he assumes that firms take input prices as given,
i.e. input price dispersion is assumed to be exogenous and firms do not optimize on how
to procure inputs.
In this project we propose to test empirically whether vertical integration decision and
input price dispersion are related using the CM and CFS data employed by Atalay (2014)
and Atalay et al. (2014).2 In particular, we aim at testing whether the VI status has an
indirect effect on procurement outcomes even in the case where an upstream establishment
is not acting as a direct supplier to customer plants of the firm. We argue that owning
productive capacities upstream endows firms with informational or bargaining advantages
which result in lower procurement prices when bargaining with suppliers outside the firm.
This could offer a potential explanation for the observed lack of intra-firm physical good
shipments documented by Atalay et al. (2014), by linking input price dispersion to the
vertical integration status of a firm.
A better understanding of the economic mechanisms underlying measured productivity
differences matters for economic policy. In particular, the framework predicts that observed
productivity differences can be driven either by firms procurement efficiency or the
exploitation of non-competitive pricing. Which effect dominates has implications for the
interpretation of observed productivity, namely whether it is a sign of high efficiency or
high market power.
In addition, by combining data from the CM and the CFS, this project enables an
evaluation of the imputation methodology used to impute missing values in the CFS data.
2We will elaborate more on how our data construction differs and expands on the data employed in
those papers in Section 2.
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Figure 4.1: Value Share of Internal Shipments
Source: Atalay, Hortaçsu, and Syverson (2014), Figure 1.
This project is therefore also useful in ensuring the data quality of U.S. Census Bureau
micro data, in particular the Commodity Flow Survey data.
Mechanism Potentially, VI can influence input prices in two ways. First, acquiring a
subsidiary in a supplier industry gives a downstream firm access to detailed knowledge
about the upstream industry’s competitive situation, input cost structure and productiv-
ity.3 The firm can potentially use this knowledge to target the most efficient upstream
producers in the process of procuring inputs from the respective industry.4
Secondly, VI potentially enhances the firm’s bargaining position with potential input
suppliers. Owning productive capacity delivers an outside option for procurement, available
without delay by avoiding the need to enter additional bargaining with alternative suppliers.
3Mueller et al. (2016) provide survey evidence from the German automotive industry that downstream
firms consider the informational implications of outsourcing important. In particular, they cite managers
stating that the loss of knowledge following the outsourcing of productive capacity could not be adequately
replaced by hiring consultancy knowledge.
4For example, bidding for procurement contracts of other buyers through the upstream subsidiary will
give the firm information on the identity of the winning upstream firm, which is likely to be indicative of
it’s efficiency.
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The decomposition of input price dispersion into a within- and between-supplier component
enables a tentative test of these two channels. A bargaining advantage would imply that
a vertically integrated customer can procure at a lower cost compared to another non-
integrated customer of the same supplier. An informational advantage would imply that a
vertically integrated firm is able to target cheaper suppliers compared to non-integrated
firms, due to better knowledge of the market in question.
Arguably, the informational advantage of being vertically integrated can also lead to
bargaining advantages in itself, e.g. if bargaining entails an informational asymmetry.
Importantly though, only the information channel would predict that VI implies advantages
at targeting potential suppliers relative to non-integrated firms. The bargaining channel
works exclusively through the price determination with a particular supplier.
Both the information and the bargaining channel predict vertically integrated establish-
ments to procure at lower input prices. However, they predict different mechanisms: The
information channel predicts that integrated firms procure from more efficient suppliers.
It remains silent on within-supplier price dispersion. The bargaining channel on the other
hand predicts that procurement price advantages are achieved through getting better
prices from the same suppliers than non-integrated firms. Put differently, the information
channel predicts price advantages through the extensive margin, while the bargaining
channel predicts price advantages through the intensive margin. Thus, bargaining advan-
tages have implications for within-supplier price spreads, while the information channel
predicts price differences between suppliers and relative to the industry average price. The
U.S. Economic Census data described below offer a unique way to distinguish between
these two mechanisms empirically.
Predictions The mechanism just sketched has the following two main implications for
between- and within-supplier price dispersion:
(i) Within-industry price dispersion: Everything else equal, firms which are vertically
integrated into industry j procure inputs from j at a lower price than non-integrated
firms. This is true for both the information and the bargaining channel.
(ii) Between-supplier price dispersion: Vertically integrated firms should be able to
target cheaper suppliers. Therefore, they should procur from producers that are on
average cheaper than non-integrated firms procuring from the same industry. This
prediciton is unique to the information channel.
(iii) Within-supplier price dispersion: Suppliers charge customers with more upstream
links and upstream productive capacity relatively lower prices compared to customers
without upstream establishments. This prediction is unique to the bargaining channel.
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In addition, there are auxiliary predictions of the information channel indirectly related
to price dispersion:
(iv) Through better information, vertically integrated establishments are linked to fewer
upstream sellers, as the firm is able to target potential suppliers more precisely. This
is an implication of the information channel.
(v) Better targeting also implies that the firm, on average, procures from more cost-
efficient plants relative to other firms without a subsidiary in the respective industry.
In order to test these predictions empirically, establishment-level data on input prices
is necessary. Given these, predictions (i) to (iv) can be tested empirically by combining
input price level data with data on the following items:
1. A plant-level indicator of vertical integration for each buyer-supplier relationship.
More precisely, such an indicator would be equal to one, if the buying plant is part
of a firm owning upstream capacity in the industry of the supplying plant and zero
otherwise.
2. A variable indicating the number of upstream suppliers of a particular establishment
from a particular industry.
3. A variable for the cost efficiency/productivity of the supplying plant relative to the
average productivity in the respective industry.
4. A variable capturing the relative price a firm pays relative to other customers of the
same supplier.
The empirical strategy is described in more detail below, following a discussion of the U.S.
Economic Census data used to construct items 1 – 4.
4.2 Data
The hypotheses can be tested using establishment and shipment level data from the U.S.
Economic Census. Similar data have already been constructed and used by Atalay et al.
(2014) and Atalay (2014) for their analyses. The main data sources are the Census of
Manufactures (CM) and its Materials and Production Supplement and the Commodity
Flow Survey (CFS) at establishment and shipment level of detail, respectively. The
combination of CM and CFS data enables the identification of buyer-supplier pairs in
combination with price and quantity information on shipments, both of which is necessary
to test the maintained hypotheses and are a unique to the Economic Census data. In
addition, we draw on data from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), the BEA
Input-Output tables and the NBER-CES Manufacturing Productivity Database.
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CM The CM contains variables on establishments productive capacities such as employ-
ment, wage bill, book value of capital and structures as well as electricity expenditures. In
addition, a subset of industries and establishments provide quantity and value of products
produced (at seven-digit level) and consumed (at six-digit level). The CM is conducted in
years ending in ’2’ and ’7’. While Atalay (2014) focuses on a small subset of industries
with homogeneous output, Atalay et al. (2014) use the establishments in the Longitudinal
Business Database, spanning a much wider range of industries. Since it will be possible to
control for industry effects, for this project we would focus on the latter, more complete
sample.
CFS The CFS is part of the Economic Census and provides information on the type,
destination, origin, weight, value and mode of transportation of commodities shipped.
The CFS covers mining, manufacturing, wholesale and some service trade industries in
the U.S. By providing precise information on source and destination of shipments, the
CFS indirectly enables the identification buyer-supplier establishment pairs. For more
details, see below.
Data construction Constructing the data necessary to test the hypothesis on the
relationship of VI and input price dispersion poses two main challenges. First, we need an
indicator for what is a vertically integrated plant and second we need to identify both the
sender and the recipient plant of a particular shipment and the latter’s firm. Constructing
those measures closely follows the work done by Atalay et al. (2014) and Atalay (2014).
While they analyze the data based on the characteristics of the supplying plant, we
are more interested in the perspective of the consuming plant. The variable definitions
are very closely related nonetheless. Atalay et al. (2014) are interested exclusively in
shipments of firms that are vertically integrated, whereas we look at the entire sample of
shipments, including shipments by non-integrated firms. Furthermore, they do not exploit
the information on shipment prices available from the CFS. Atalay (2014) employs the
shipment price information from the CFS to control for plant level input and output
price dispersion. His analysis is limited to a small number of industries, characterized by
homogeneous products. We are looking at price dispersion in the entire manufacturing
sector. In addition to the VI indicator, we need to construct a measure of plant productivity
and create measures of price dispersion. We will discuss the different parts in more detail
next.
1. Vertical integration indicators for establishments
The final aim is to construct vertical integration indicators on shipment level, which
are the main variables of interest for our analysis, as we try to distinguish procurement
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outcomes of vertically integrated versus non-integrated firms. Shipments are flagged as
vertically integrated if the recipient plant is vertically integrated into the sending plant’s
industry. The creation of VI indicators for establishments requires two parts. First, it is
necessary to map the relative upstreamness of industries and second we need to identify
whether a plant is part of a firm with productive capacity in the respective upstream
industry. For the second step, we also need to identify the plant receiving the shipment,
which is done in Step 3. below.
In order to map the relative upstreamness of industries make use of information from the
U.S. Input-Output tables. In particular, two industries i and j are defined as vertically
linked if upstream industry j ships more than 5% of it’s total ouput to industry i.5
Information on the split of sales across industries is obtained from the BEA’s Input-
Output tables.6
Second, using this industry level information, a downstream establishment in an industry
i is identified as vertically integrated into an industry j if it is owned by a firm that owns
a plant in an industry j located upstream in the product space as well. The necessary
plant ownership indicators are obtained from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD)
data.7 Finally, as already mentioned above, shipments are flagged as vertically integrated
if the recipient plant is vertically integrated into the sending plant’s industry.
2. Sender and receiver establishment identities of shipments
In order to connect buyer-supplier relationships with other establishment characteristics,
we need to identify both ends of each transaction. Sender establishment identities are
directly available from CFS data. However, this is not the case for receiver establishments.
Instead, the CFS data contains only zip-code destinations of shipments. Therefore, the
recipient plant of a shipment has to be imputed. In order to do this, we again closely
follow the approach taken by Atalay et al. (2014). Potentially, any plant located in the
destination zip code of a shipment could be the receiving entity. Among all plants in the
5This cutoff could be varied for robustness. Generally, a lower cutoff will make more shipments
vertically integrated, i.e. expand our overall sample. This comes with the caveat that with a low cutoff
we include additional industry pairs in the analysis between which shipments are not frequent. As long
as price dispersion along those links is not different from higher volume links, this should not present a
problem.
6 Atalay et al. (2014) use additional, more disaggregated information from wholesale and retail trade
sector surveys in order to achieve a finer disaggregation of industries and to trace shipments mediated by
retailers/wholesalers. For simplicity, we focus on the readily available Input-Output information.
7Our definition of VI status differs slightly from Atalay et al. (2014). While they are interested in the
VI status of upstream plant’s owner, for the bargaining perspective we are interested in, the integration
of the downstream plant’s firm is the relevant dimension.
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destination zip code of a shipment, we first keep only those that belong to an industry
downstream of the sending plant’s industry. If among the remaining candidate plants,
there is a plant belonging to the same firm as the sending plant, we assign this plant as
recipient. This implies that if possible, the shipment will be counted as taking place within
the firm. This choice reflects our prior that shipments within the firm are more likely than
shipments between firms.8 If there are still multiple remaining recipient candidates left,
we assign one of the remaining plants randomly.9
3. Marginal cost/productivity of suppliers
The information channel predicts procurement of integrated firms from relatively more
efficient suppliers. In order to control for the efficiency of suppliers, we construct standard
revenue productivity measures using industry level price deflators and industry level factor
shares coming from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. For calculating
productivity, we assume that plants within an industry produce using a gross output
Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale and common factor
shares including capital, labor, materials and energy as production factors.
4. Within-industry, between-supplier and within-supplier price spreads
The definition of average price spreads for this project is different from the definition used
by Atalay (2014). The reason is that we are interested in the relationship between VI
and the degree of price dispersion. Since VI is defined only with respect to a particular
upstream industry, the measures of price dispersion have to be industry-specific as well.
We will define measures of within-industry, between-supplier and within-supplier price
dispersion in turn, which are used to test hypotheses (i) to (iii). To fix ideas, lets define
a particular shipment s, the supplying (upstream) industry I, with plants i ∈ {1, ..., I},
the buying (downstream) industry J , with plants j ∈ {1, ..., J} and the entire universe of
plants N , with n ∈ {1, ..., N}.





8Shipments assigned as internal will be dropped in the subsequent analysis, see also detailed discussion
of sample selection below.
9Further robustness checks on the assignment algorithm are possible. A first one would be to weigh the
assignment probability by the size of the plants, or by the amount of materials consumed. An additional
robustness check would be to exploit information on the type of good shipped: From the CM data, we
know the main type of material consumed by a plant. This can potentially be matched against the
commodity code of the shipment. This requires a concordance between CM product code classification
and the STCC product classification used in the CFS, which is work in progress.
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where χsijt is the weight of the shipment and ωsijt the shipment value. From now on,
drop t for expositional clarity. We follow Atalay et al. (2014) and aggregate all shipments
between two plants in a year. To do that, we define the average shipment price from plant









where χijt is the total mass of shipments in year t and ωijt the total value in the respective
year. Both are available from the CFS by aggregating quantities and values from all
individual shipments s from i to j in t.
Within-industry price dispersion. This measures whether a firm j ∈ J pays less for
inputs from an upstream industry I than what the upstream industry charges on average.














where ΓI(j) denotes the set of suppliers of firm j from industry I. The measure of







Between-supplier price dispersion. Prediction (ii) states that a vertically integrated
firm will on average procure from lower cost producers than non-integrated firms. For this,
we need to compare the average price paid for inputs from each supplier i from industry I
by firm j, to the average price of that supplier. Begin by defining the average price of a






The relative price of this firm wrt it’s own industry is defined as ψi ≡ log(P i/P I). Using






Within-supplier price dispersion. Prediction (iii) states that given a supplier i,
a VI-establishment j pays less than a non-integrated establishment j′. Thus, we are
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interested in the price charged by i from this particular firm, Pij, relative to the average
price charged by the supplier i, P i, define this as ψij ≡ log(Pij/P i). Then, averaging over






Sample Selection Our sample covers establishments that are present in the CFS, the
CM and the LBD. The CFS covers mining, manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade
industries. We restrict the sample to plants present in the Census of Manufactures, since
we use that information to construct productivity and other plant measures for controls.
We drop all shipments originating from or go to so called Administrative Records (AR)
establishments from the Census, since these are small establishments (up to 5 employees)
for which almost all data are imputed. This strategy follows the typical approach in the
literature. We further restrict the sample to domestic shipments and drop all shipments
destined for export. We also drop shipments between two plants owned by the same firm.
The prices in our data are in fact unit values of shipments. Our maintained assumption
is that for shipments between firms, the value of a shipment reflects the price paid by
the buyer. Since shipments within firms are not necessarily priced at market value, it is
unclear what the reported shipment values actually reflect in those cases. For this reason,
we restrict the analysis to shipments between different firms.
Decomposition of Price Dispersion We will be particularly interested in shipment
characteristics by sending plant, the relative frequency of internal, vertically integrated
and non-integrated shipments across firms of different sizes as well as the decomposition
of overall price dispersion into the between-supplier and the within-supplier components
for the full sample across shipments. Since our dispersion measures are in logarithms, the














This distinction can help to assess the economic sources of observed price dispersion. A
large share of between price dispersion hints at the presence of heterogeneous firms in the
supplier market, while a large share of within price dispersion indicates that firms are
able to price discriminate across different customers. In a perfectly competitive market,
both within and between sender price dispersion should be zero.
Sample including Recipient Output Prices The CFS is recorded only at the sender
level. However, in our recipient assignment algorithm we choose plants as recipients from
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the same underlying population of the CMF that the CFS was drawn from. Therefore,
there is a positive probability that a plant assigned as recipient in one particular shipment
is sampled in the CFS as a sender for another shipment. This implies that for a subsample
of the shipments, we will know the average prices charged for the output of the recipient
plant. This is of interest in our context since it enables us to partially control for product
quality when estimating the effect of VI on procurement prices.
4.3 Estimation Strategy
The basic exercise for testing hypotheses (i) to (iii) is to regress industry price deviation,
between-supplier price deviation and within-supplier price deviation of a buyer-supplier
link on the indicator for vertical integration of the buying plant. The baseline specification
is given by
xijt = β0 + β11{V Ij(i) 6=∅} + βCChit + εhit.
Here, V Ij(i) is the set of plants in the industry of i of the firm owning j and 1 the indicator
function. Chit contains a vector of controls, such as firm size and industry and time fixed
effects. The set of controls will be discussed in more detail below. The dependent variable
xijt is chosen depending on which hypothesis (i) to (v) is tested. For the main hypotheses
(i) to (iii), of within-industry, between-supplier and within-supplier price dispersion, xsijt
is given by ψIj, ψij and ψij, respectively. It is important to note that in order to test
hypotheses (i) to (v), we are interested in the aggregate relationship between input prices
and VI and not in the characteristics of individual firms. Therefore, the hypotheses can be
tested and presented while ensuring the confidentiality of individual firm characteristics.
With this empirical specification, we aim to estimate the effect of VI on the price of a
shipment, relative to the sender or industry average price. The main challenge for our
estimation is the fact that in principle the VI status of a plant is a choice variable of
the owning firm and that we do not have a truly exogenous source of variation for the
VI status of a particular plant. Our approach is therefore to match firms as closely as
possible with exception of VI status and control for differences between plants that might
be driving VI status and/or the relative price of the transaction.10
We control for three major types of confounders: firm size, plant ’type’ and product quality.
Regarding firm size, larger firms own more plants and are therefore mechanically more
likely to be vertically integrated. We therefore want to compare plants owned by firms
10While we cannot rule out reverse causality, we think that in our setup it is not likely to drive the
results. For relative input prices to impact the VI status, non-integrated firms facing relatively high prices
would have to buy a plant in the suppling industry with the aim of getting better prices from their (now)
competitors, rather than with the aim of producing their own inputs. This seems like a rather unlikely
way to improve on procurement costs.
119
of similar size. Second, we control for plant type by controlling for plant size, TFP and
capital-labor ratio. Plant size directly influences the quantities bought, which will have an
impact on procurement costs as long as pricing is non-linear. TFP and K/L might be
indicators of product quality. As a more direct control of product quality, we will control
for buyers’ output prices. This will potentially come at the cost of reducing the sample
size.
An additional, clearly important control is shipment distance. The shipment prices are
free-on-board prices excluding shipment costs, mitigating the importance of this control,
nonetheless, it is a natural candidate. The construction of this is work in progress.11
In addition to those controls, we include year fixed effects and a set of industry fixed
effects. In particular, we exploit variation between senders of the same industry, between
recipients of the same industry and to particular input-output industry links.
Alternative estimation strategy The main estimation strategy just outlined relies
on cross-sectional variation in VI. We choose this strategy closely following the empirical
setup of Atalay (2014). In order to corroborate the evidence, an alternative approach
would be to exploit the panel dimension of the data, since the CFS is available in five-year
waves. In particular, given the data it is in principle possible to estimate how procurement
prices change following a change of establishment ownership between firms with different
VI status. The analysis in Atalay et al. (2014) indicates that there is a substantial number
of changes in VI status among the plants in the Census of Manufacturers.12 Thus, an
alternative estimation strategy could rely on changes in procurement prices following a
change in vertical integration status. However, the feasibility of such an analysis crucially
depends (i) on the number of establishments in the CFS which are present throughout
subsequent survey waves and (ii) on the extend to which these data coincide with changes
in the VI status in the CM data.
In addition, the particular nature of our data implies that standard panel methods
cannot be directly applied. The panel variable in our analysis would be the sender and/or
recipient plant. However, since the underlying data are on shipment level, plant identity
does not uniquely identify an observation within a year. This is also true when aggregating
11In addition, it might be useful to look at the relative distance between the recipient plant and the
shipping plant, and the recipient plant and the plant making a shipment vertically integrated. This might
in particular play a role in determining the choice between VI and internal shipments, which is not the
direct subject of our analysis.
12Table 3, Panel D in Atalay et al. (2014) indicates that out of their CM sample observations, about
5% are changing ownership status from non-VI to VI. For our analysis, considering in addition the reverse
change from VI to non-VI would further generate additional observations.
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shipments between two particular plants.
Evaluating the CFS Imputation In addition to shedding light on the determinants
of observed firm productivity, this project can serve to evaluate the imputation procedure
of the CFS. As noted in the previous paragraph, the CFS data are partially imputed.
Importantly, these imputations do not differentiate between different shipment receivers.13
Thus, the imputation procedure implicitly assumes that value and quantity of shipments
do not vary systematically across recipients. In contrast, the hypothesis we propose to
test predicts exactly that shipments prices (i.e. value-quantity ratios) vary systematically
with the identity of the receiving establishment, depending on whether it is part of a
vertically integrated firm or not. By merging the CM and the CFS data, this project
potentially adds information to the recipient establishments of a shipment in the CFS
data. We propose to use this in order to evaluate whether the implicit assumption made in
the imputation is valid. Thereby this project potentially contributes to the quality control
of U.S. Census Bureau data, in particular the CFS data.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In this project we outline a strategy to test whether input price dispersion and vertical
integration status of firms are linked. In particular, we argue that owning productive
capacities enables firms to exploit informational and bargaining advantages in order to
achieve lower procurement prices. We describe how the specific features of U.S. Economic
Census data from the Census of Manufacturers and the Commodity Flow Survey, in
particular rare information on input and output prices, can be used to separately identify
and test the information and bargaining channel. This data has already been used by
Atalay (2014) and Atalay et al. (2014) to establish the stylized facts that motivate the
question of this paper, however, they focus on VI and input price dispersion in isolation
and do not link the two phenomena.
This project aims at shedding light on the determinants of firm productivity. Given the
importance of firm productivity for aggregate economic performance, it is important
to identify the economic mechanisms driving differences in observed plant productivity.
By linking plant productivity to firm organization, the present proposal also aims at
contributing to the understanding of the effects of mergers and acquisitions. In particular,
this we suggest to test a mechanism for potential gains from ownership integration, namely
13According to the U.S. Census Bureau documentation on the 2012 CFS (http://www.census.gov/
econ/cfs/2012_methodology.html), imputations are done using a donor imputation model. Donor
shipments are identified using information on sender identity and shipment class, but do not include
information on the destination of the shipment.
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advantages in input procurement.
In addition, by combining data from the CM and the CFS, this project enables an
evaluation of the imputation methodology used to impute missing values in the CFS data.
This project is therefore also useful in ensuring the data quality of U.S. Census Bureau
micro data, in particular the Commodity Flow Survey data.
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